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A firm's productivity depends on how production is organized given the level of demand for its product.
To capture this mechanism, we develop a theory of an economy where firms with heterogeneous demands
use labor and knowledge to produce. Entrepreneurs decide the number of layers of management and
the knowledge and span of control of each agent. As a result, in the theory, heterogeneity in demand
leads to heterogeneity in productivity and other firms' outcomes. We use the theory to analyze the
impact of international trade on organization and calibrate the model to the U.S. economy. Our results
indicate that, as a result of a bilateral trade liberalization, firms that export will increase the number
of layers of management and will decentralize decisions. The new organization of the average exporter
results in higher productivity, although the responses of productivity are heterogeneous across these
firms. In contrast, non-exporters reduce their number of layers, decentralization, and, on average, their
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A ￿rm￿ s productivity depends on how production is organized given the level of demand for its
product. To capture this mechanism, we develop a theory of an economy where ￿rms with heterogeneous
demands use labor and knowledge to produce. Entrepreneurs decide the number of layers of management
and the knowledge and span of control of each agent. As a result, in the theory, heterogeneity in demand
leads to heterogeneity in productivity and other ￿rms￿outcomes. We use the theory to analyze the
impact of international trade on organization and calibrate the model to the U.S. economy. Our results
indicate that, as a result of a bilateral trade liberalization, ￿rms that export will increase the number
of layers of management and will decentralize decisions. The new organization of the average exporter
results in higher productivity, although the responses of productivity are heterogeneous across these
￿rms. In contrast, non-exporters reduce their number of layers, decentralization, and, on average, their
productivity. The marginal exporter increases its productivity by about 1% and its revenue productivity
by about 1.8%.
1. INTRODUCTION
Production requires organization. In order to produce ￿rms need to hire managers that organize inputs,
that solve the problems that arise in production, and that plan for the future, among other tasks. As a
result, the productivity of a ￿rm depends on the way its production is organized. Of course, how much a
￿rm is willing to invest in organizing its production by hiring a hierarchy of managers, with di⁄erent amounts
of knowledge and particular tasks within the ￿rm, depends on the scale of its output. It would be clearly
ine¢ cient for a small family business to have the same organizational structure as a large multinational
￿rm that sells all around the world. These di⁄erences in organization are obvious for anyone that has seen
the complicated organizational hierarchy of a ￿rm like IBM and, at the same time, has bought anything
in a mom-and-pop shop around the corner. The implications of organizational decisions for the gains from
￿We thank Pol Antr￿s, Kyle Bagwell, Paco Buera, Arnaud Costinot, Luis Garicano, Elhanan Helpman, Wolfgang Keller,
Alex Monge, Steve Redding, Steve Yeaple and many seminar participants for useful conversations and comments. Caliendo
thanks the International Economics Section at Princeton University.
1international trade and other changes in the economic environment are less obvious. In fact, organizational
structure is absent in virtually all international trade theories.1 How do these organizational di⁄erences
a⁄ect productivity? How are they re￿ ected in the within-￿rm distribution of wages and skills? How are
organization and productivity impacted by ￿rm decisions that change its scale, like the decision to export?
We study the internal organization of ￿rms in a product market. The market is formed by a continuum of
di⁄erentiated products. The demand for these products varies depending on their individual characteristics.
An entrepreneur can enter the market after designing her product, which conveys a ￿xed cost. A particular
design is associated with a level of demand for the product that is random. Once the entrepreneur observes the
resulting demand for the product she envisioned, she can organize production to serve local and international
markets. The decision of how to organize production in turn determines the productivity of the ￿rm as well
as its input use, price, and pro￿ts.
We model an economy in which production requires labor and knowledge. We follow Garicano (2000) and
Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2004, 2006 and 2011) and model ￿rms as knowledge-based hierarchies where
managers deal with exceptions. In this production structure workers in the ￿rm provide work time. For each
unit of work time they can potentially produce A goods. Problems have to be solved in order for output to
be realized. In order to solve problems agents acquire specialized knowledge. Acquiring knowledge is costly,
and workers can only use their knowledge to solve the problem they face on their own production activity.
So in general, it is not e¢ cient for the ￿rm to make workers learn how to solve infrequent problems. Instead,
hierarchies are created where managers learn how to solve the less common problems ￿ the ￿ exceptions￿ ￿and
workers deal with the routine problems. When workers are confronted with a problem they do not know
how to solve, they ask the manager. The organizational structure determines the knowledge acquired by
agents, the order in which di⁄erent agents confront problems, and how they communicate with each other.
Organization economizes on the use of knowledge by leveraging the knowledge of managers. A larger ￿rm
can have more than one layer of managers, where managers learn less common problems the higher they
are in the hierarchy. All ￿rms have a top manager, the CEO or entrepreneur. Of course, adding a layer
of management is costly, since one has to pay managers that do not generate production possibilities, but
only solve problems. As a result, adding layers involves an extra cost that is only worth paying if the ￿rm
produces a high enough quantity. Adding an extra layer of management can be thought of as reducing the
marginal cost of the ￿rm, in exchange for increasing the ￿xed cost. Nevertheless, given that we provide
a fully microfounded theory of the organization of production, the menu of ￿xed costs and marginal costs
faced by the ￿rm is endogenous and depends on the cost of acquiring and communicating knowledge as well
as other characteristics of the economy.
We incorporate this production technology into an economy in which agents have CES preferences and
where ￿rms compete with each other monopolistically. Hence, ￿rms determine the price that maximizes
1This is clearly the case for the two main models in international trade today, namely, Melitz (2003) and Eaton and Kortum
(2002), as well as virtually all other available theories. An exception is the work of Marin and Verdier (2008, 2010), who study
the degree to which free trade can centralize the decision process inside an organization.
2their pro￿ts. As is common with this structure, they set prices using a constant markup rule. However,
given that they are making simultaneous decisions about their organizational structure, their marginal cost
is now an endogenous variable. In a closed economy, the only exogenous and heterogeneous characteristic of
a ￿rm is the level of demand for its product, which we parameterize with a demand shifter ￿. In an open
economy, the ￿rm can decide to export to other markets as well. We fully characterize the cost minimization
problem of a ￿rm given a demand level. Crucially, the level of demand determines the productivity of a ￿rm
by determining its optimal organizational structure.
Our theory exploits the basic idea that the productivity of a ￿rm is the result of the way production is
organized given the level of demand for its product. This link between demand and productivity is present in
any production technology in which a ￿rm needs to make some costly investment decision in order to expand
production. A classic example is the decision to expand by increasing the number of plants. Another one is
the decision to invest in new technologies (as in Atkeson and Burstein, 2010, Bustos, 2011, Costantini and
Melitz, 2008, Lileeva and Tre￿ er, 2010, and Yeaple, 2005). We model the decision to form a management
hierarchy by adding new layers of management, since it allows us to study a rich set of internal characteristics
of the ￿rm, as well as the e⁄ect of learning costs and communication technology on ￿rms￿outcomes. These
investments allow the ￿rm to produce more and at the same time lower the ￿rm￿ s average cost. Thus, there
is a link between the level of demand, the level of investments of the ￿rm, and the productivity of the ￿rm.
There is another link between the level of demand and productivity that is not present in other papers in
the literature, namely, the explicit modeling of the discreteness of many of these investment decisions. Take,
for example, the decision of how many plants to use for production. If each plant has an identical minimum
e¢ cient scale (MES),2 the ￿rst e⁄ect discussed above is not present. However, because the number of plants
the ￿rm chooses to built is discrete, the productivity of the ￿rm will depend on its production level per
plant relative to the MES of a plant. If the ￿rm is producing below the MES in each plant (and average
costs at the plant level are convex), an increase in demand will increase the productivity of the ￿rm. If it
is producing above the MES (but not by enough to build a new plant), a small increase in demand that
does not trigger the construction of a new plant will decrease its productivity. In this sense, the fact that
the decision of how many plants to build is discrete will result in heterogeneous responses in productivity to
positive demand shocks (or in di⁄erences in productivity across ￿rms).3
In our theory, both of these mechanisms are present. Since the number of layers in the ￿rm is discrete,
the second e⁄ect arises naturally. However, because more layers allow the ￿rm to manage the acquisition of
knowledge of its labor force more e¢ ciently, more layers also imply a reduction in the minimum average cost
of the ￿rm.
The paper is related to the literature on knowledge-based hierarchies. The main distinction between this
2The minimum e¢ cient scale is de￿ned as the scale of production at which a ￿rm minimizes average costs given a number
of layers.
3The literature on multi-product ￿rms has considered the decision to add or drop products and the within-￿rm revenue
productivity changes that result from this type of selection. See for example Bernard, et al. (2010) and Mayer, et al. (2011).
3paper and the related literature is that here we model production hierarchies in a product market where
￿rms produce di⁄erentiated products. This allows us to study the internal organization and productivity
of heterogeneous ￿rms in general equilibrium. Furthermore, it allows us to study the e⁄ect of a trade
liberalization on organization and ￿rm productivity. The result is a model that can be readily contrasted
with the data and that delivers clear testable implications. As far as we know, this is the ￿rst paper to
incorporate a rich organizational model into a heterogeneous ￿rm context.4
The vast literature on trade and heterogeneous ￿rms has been successful at providing a framework with
which to analyze individual ￿rm experiences in an international trade context. However, in this literature a
￿rm is just a technology to produce goods at a given marginal cost. The basic equilibrium framework of our
model is similar to the one used in this literature but incorporates a much richer organizational structure, as
well as endogenous productivity heterogeneity across ￿rms and wage heterogeneity across and within ￿rms.
In fact, we show that Melitz (2003) is a special case of our model when knowledge becomes costless.
The paper aims to speak to the empirical literature on the response of ￿rm organization and productivity
to trade liberalization. The papers by Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998) and Bernard and Jensen (1999)
show that larger and more productive ￿rms export. They also provide evidence that ￿rms that decide to
export are larger and have a larger probability of survival, but they do not ￿nd evidence that exporting leads
to higher productivity.5 In our framework ￿rms that export are larger in terms of employment, but their
productivity does not necessarily rise. Other papers, such as Baldwin and Gu (2003), Van Biesebroeck (2004)
and De Loecker (2007, 2011), have found more signi￿cant e⁄ects of trade liberalization on productivity.6
These apparently contradictory ￿ndings can be rationalized with our theory. We ￿nd that the e⁄ect of trade
on a ￿rm￿ s productivity is heterogeneous and depends on how large ￿rms are before trade liberalization, the
size of the new market, export costs, as well as information and communication technology. For example,
the e⁄ect of trade on the productivity of large ￿rms (in terms of employment or output) is, in general,
smaller than the e⁄ect of trade on the productivity of small ￿rms. Even for large and small ￿rms, there are
heterogeneous responses depending on whether they add management layers, and their position relative to
the MES of production of their chosen organizational design. In our model, all exporting ￿rms that gain
productivity produce at a higher scale compared to autarky, and many of them add a layer of management
as a consequence of starting to export. On the other hand, non-exporters reduce their scale of production
compared to autarky. Non-exporters that were producing in autarky above their MES gain in productivity,
while non-exporters that were producing at the MES, or below, reduce their productivity unless they reduce
4Antr￿s, et al. (2006 and 2008) study the implications of o⁄shoring on wage inequality using a similar model of organizations.
In contrast to this paper they model an economy in which ￿rm heterogeneity is the result of worker heterogeneity and study
how the ability to form international teams changes the composition of two-layer production teams, all of which produce a
single good. Here we abstract from exogenous worker heterogeneity and let knowledge acquisition and the number of layers be
endogenously determined. Perhaps more important, we model an economy with ￿rm heterogeneity in demand in which trade
is the result of products being di⁄erentiated as in Melitz (2003).
5Other papers that document similar ￿ndings are Delgado, et al. (2002) and Bernard and Jensen (2004).
6Again, other papers are Aw, et al. (2000), Hallward-Driemeier, et al. (2005), Fernandes and Isgut (2006), Park, et al.
(2006), Aw, et al. (2007), and Aw, et al. (2008).
4the number of management layers in the organization.
Heterogeneous responses in productivity as a result of a bilateral trade liberalization have been recently
documented by Lileeva and Tre￿ er (2010). They study the responses of productivity and technology up-
grading for Canadian plants after CUSFTA went into e⁄ect. They show that plants with low pre-agreement
productivity invested more in information and communication technologies, as well as product innovation.
Any of these investments could be attributed to changes in their organizational structure, but the ￿rst two
are more closely related. They also document that new exporting ￿rms that experienced productivity gains
increased their domestic sales relative to non-exporters, as implied by our theory. A recent paper by Bustos
(2011) also ￿nds a heterogeneous response in technology upgrading. She ￿nds that reductions in tari⁄s
induce process innovation mostly in the 3rd quartile of the ￿rm size distribution and not only in new but
also in old exporters, Again, a heterogeneous response as predicted by our theory.
Regarding the internal reorganization of ￿rms, Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) present evidence that increasing
competition (as a result of international trade) leads to ￿ atter hierarchies, something our model can explain
for the non-exporting ￿rms. They also show that the opportunity to sell in more markets can lead to
￿rms with more management layers, although the results here are more noisy. Given the heterogeneity in
the responses to trade liberalization in our theory, looking at just average responses necessarily leads to
less accurate results. So again, our theory can rationalize these ￿ndings. More important, by providing
a structural framework of trade with organization we can relate the di⁄erent dimensions of ￿rms￿actions
and so can guide future empirical research on the determinants of within-￿rm responses to trade policy and
technological changes.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the production technology and
solves the cost minimization problem of ￿rms. We also study the pro￿t maximization problem of ￿rms and
the equilibrium of the model in a closed economy. Section 3 presents our results for the open economy. In
Section 4 we calibrate the model to the U.S. economy and perform several trade liberalization experiments
to illustrate our results. Finally, Section 5 concludes. We relegate all proofs to the Appendix.
2. THE MODEL
The economy is formed by ~ N agents that supply one unit of time. All agents are ex-ante identical and












where x(￿) denotes the consumption of variety ￿, M is the mass of products available to the consumer, ￿(￿)
the probability distribution over the available varieties in ￿, and ￿ > 1 the elasticity of substitution. Note
that ￿ is a demand shifter that implies that agents like varieties with higher ￿ better.
Agents can work either in the production sector or in the schooling sector. Since agents are ex-ante identical
in equilibrium, all of them obtain an equilibrium wage w as compensation for the unit of time they supply in
5the market (they are also compensated for the knowledge they acquire, as we discuss below). We call agents
that want to start a new ￿rm entrepreneurs. An entrepreneur pays a ￿xed cost fE to design its product.
After the product is developed, the demand for the product, ￿, is realized from a cumulative distribution
function given by G(￿): This draw determines the demand schedule faced by the ￿rm. The entrepreneur
then creates an organization if her draw is high enough to obtain pro￿ts given the ￿xed production cost f.
Production requires labor and knowledge. Within an organization agents divide into two main classes:
workers and problem solvers or managers. Workers supply their unit of time to generate a production
possibility. For this production possibility to become output, the organization needs to solve a problem.
Solving problems requires knowledge. In particular, each production possibility draws a problem from the
cumulative distribution F (￿) with decreasing density. A realization z implies that in order to solve the
problem the worker needs to have acquired a set of knowledge that includes z as an element. If the worker￿ s
knowledge includes z, the problem is solved and the production possibility becomes A units of output. If
the worker cannot solve the problem, she asks a manager one layer above for a solution, if the ￿rm has hired
such a manager. Suppose it has. Then the manager spends h units of time listening to the worker￿ s problem
(so h is the cost of communication) and solves the problem if her knowledge includes z. If the knowledge
of the lowest layer of managers cannot solve the problem, the worker has the option to send the problem
one layer higher, and so on, until the problem reaches the top layer, formed by a single agent, namely, the
entrepreneur.
The organizational design of the ￿rm involves determining the number of layers as well as the knowledge
and number of agents in each layer. The cost of learning is linear in the euclidean length of the knowledge
set. So if an agent learns how to solve problems in the interval [0;z], she has to pay wcz: That is, the cost
of knowledge is wc per unit of knowledge. Of course, since F(￿) has a decreasing density, agents at the
bottom of the hierarchy, which attempt to solve the problem ￿rst, learn the most common problems, and
agents in higher layers learn more rare and exceptional problems progressively. We assume that knowledge
is not cumulative so in order to solve a problem z the agent needs to know an interval that includes z, but
we do not force the agent to learn how to solve all problems between z and 0.7 The cost of knowledge is
proportional to the wage, since learning requires teachers in the schooling sector that earn w. So learning
one unit of knowledge requires c units of time of a teacher at wage w.8
Consider ￿rst the case of a self-employed entrepreneur, a one-worker ￿rm. The entrepreneur draws prob-
lems from the known exponential distribution of problems, F (￿); and acquires knowledge [0;z] to solve them.
7The cumulative case, in which all agents have to learn intervals that include the most common problems yields qualitatively
very similar results. It is not clear to us, that one assumption dominates the other. Do CEO￿ s need to know how to do the
tasks of production workers even if in equilibrium they never do them? Of course, assuming cumulative knowledge would imply
larger and increasing learning costs and, therefore, wages that are necessarily increasing in the layer of the employee.
8Note that this interpretation implicitly assumes that every period workers need to be retrained. Since we consider a general
equilibrium model in steady state that is calibrated to the share of education workers, one can reinterpret c as the cost of
training workers times the share of workers that die every period. In that case, the cost of knowledge is c = ￿M~ c where ￿M is
the population mortality rate and ~ c is the cost of training workers when only new workers have to be trained. We return to
this point in the calibration of the model, where our calibration under this interpretation implies that the stock of knowledge
in units of workers is equivalent to about 4 times the population.
6For simplicity, throughout the paper we let F (z) = 1 ￿ e￿￿z and we discuss the implications of this choice
as we describe our results.9 The parameter ￿ > 0 regulates how common the problems faced in production
are. Higher ￿ implies that problems are less costly to solve since the distribution has more mass close to
zero.10 Since the entrepreneur has only one unit of time and since she is the sole worker in the ￿rm, she
has to spend her time generating production possibilities. This implies that even if she knows how to solve
all problems, her output is bounded by the amount of output generated by a single production possibility,
namely, A. The parameter A re￿ ects the overall technology of the economy. So if the knowledge acquired
by the entrepreneur is z0





= 1 ￿ e￿￿z
0
0; and the expected
output she produces is A[1￿e￿￿z
0
0]. Throughout, we let z‘
L denote the knowledge of an agent in layer ‘ of a
￿rm with highest layer L (and therefore L + 1 layers, since we denote the layer of workers by 0). We follow
the same notation convention for all variables.
Suppose now the entrepreneur decides to hire some workers and form a hierarchical organization with two
layers where she is at the top of the organization. The entrepreneur hires workers trained to solve the more
routine problems, z0
1. Denote by n0
1 the number of workers she hires. Since she is the only top manager,
n1
1 = 1 (more generally we impose the constraint nL
L = 1). Each worker solves a fraction of problems
[1￿e￿￿z
0
1] and the problems that they cannot solve are directed to the entrepreneur. Since the entrepreneur
spends h units of time communicating with each worker that sends her a problem to solve, it follows that




1 = 1 and so she




We can easily generalize this structure to a ￿rm with L+1 layers in which workers ask managers to solve
their problems sequentially (this ￿ ow of questions is optimal, as proven by Garicano, 2000) as long as agents
that cannot solve a problem do not know who can solve it. Then, the span of control of each manager










L=h. We can apply the law of large numbers to this problem and use the expectation of
output as the realized level of output.11
We solve the organizational problem of the ￿rm in two stages. We determine ￿rst the cost-e¢ cient way of
producing a given quantity. The solution to the cost minimization problem characterizes the cost function.
Then, given a particular draw of ￿; the entrepreneur acts like a monopolist and decides how to price the
goods and how much output to supply.
9The decreasing density of problems is just a normalization, since agents always choose to learn how to solve the most
common problems ￿rst. The exponential speci￿cation is not essential but adds some tractability to the model.
10In the limit when ￿ ! 1, knowledge is not an input in production since all problems can be solved by agents with an
in￿nitesimal amount of knowledge.
11In order to apply the law of large numbers (LLN), suppose that workers generate a production possibility in dt units of
time. Each of these production possibilities can yield Adt units of output and managers spend hdt units of their time with each
problem that reaches them. Then, as dt ! 0, the number of problems generated by the worker in a unit of time, 1=dt, converges










units of output. The rest







of her unit of time on them.
72.1. Cost Minimization
Consider a ￿rm that produces a quantity q. The variable cost function of such a ￿rm is given by
C (q;w) = min
L￿0
fCL (q;w)g (2)
where C (q;w) denotes the minimum variable cost of producing q and CL (q;w) is the minimum cost of
producing q with an organization with L + 1 layers. Since the ￿xed costs of production do not change the
organizational problem of the ￿rm, in this section we consider only the variable cost C (q;w), to which we
would need to add ￿xed costs to obtain total costs. We do so in the pro￿t maximization section below.
Throughout, to simplify the exposition, we refer to this function as the ￿ cost function.￿
The problem of a one-worker ￿rm can help us understand why there are incentives to form organizations
with more than one layer. The cost minimization problem of a ￿rm with L = 0 is then given by
C0 (q;w) = min
z￿0
w(1 + cz); subject to A[1 ￿ e￿￿z] ￿ q;
where we impose that an agent that has acquired knowledge z at cost wcz is compensated exactly for her
learning cost. This is always the case in our economy given that knowledge can be instantaneously acquired
at this cost. An organization with only one layer (L = 0) is not able to produce q > A. In that case we just
set C0 (q;w) = 1. The Lagrangian of the problem is






and so the ￿rst-order conditions are given by
wc = ￿A￿e￿￿z
0








0 is the optimal amount of knowledge. As noted before, the maximum that a self-employed entre-




= A: However, she never chooses this limit, since in order
to produce A she needs z ! 1 and so her costs converge to in￿nity. The optimal amount of knowledge
that the entrepreneur chooses as a function of quantity is given by z0






, which is ￿nite since
q < A. An entrepreneur working alone is not able to solve all the problems that she faces in production and
therefore throws away a fraction e￿￿z
0
0. If there was someone else in the organization that knew how to solve
some of these more exceptional problems, the organization would be able to produce more output. This
creates an incentive to hire agents specializing in di⁄erent types of problems. Furthermore, an organization
with more layers can increase the span of control of the entrepreneur by hiring more workers that create
more production possibilities. Of course, since adding layers is costly, for low values of q the cost-e¢ cient
way of producing might be to have a one-worker ￿rm.
Using the ￿rst-order conditions we can solve for the cost function for a one-layer (and one-worker) ￿rm to
obtain a cost function given by
























and average costs equal to AC0 (q;w) = C0 (q;w)=q.
Note that the average cost of this problem is strictly convex. This implies that there is a MES of production
for a one-layer ￿rm. The level of demand of the ￿rm, ￿; determines if the ￿rm decides to produce at this
e¢ cient scale. Figure 1 presents an example of the average cost and the marginal cost of an organization
with L = 0: As the ￿rm approaches its maximum capacity of production, A, the average cost converges to
in￿nity (only one-worker ￿rms have a maximum capacity, as we will see below).
Now consider the minimization problem of an organization with L > 0 layers:
































L is the cumulative knowledge of the ￿rm up to layer l. Since the knowledge of agents in
two distinct layers never overlaps, if an agent learns an interval of size zl

















. Agents at lower layers learn more-common problems in
order to economize on the time of their managers. Hence, the resulting distribution of problems can always
be normalized to have a decreasing density, like the exponential. So, for a given number of layers, L, the
entrepreneur decides the number of workers to hire in each layer (nl
L) and the knowledge of the employees
at each layer (zl

























































Figure 1: Average and marginal cost, L = 0 Figure 2: Average and marginal cost, L = f0;1g
9The entrepreneur is always at the top of the organization, and so nL


























































are the Lagrange multipliers associated with both constraints. The ￿rst-order condition

















The ￿rst-order conditions for zl
L; all 0 < l < L; are
he￿￿Z
l￿1







































The rest of the ￿rst-order conditions are given by the constraints and





L ￿ 0; ￿
l
Lzl
L = 0 for all l:
Note that we allow the entrepreneur to choose zero knowledge at any layer. It is easy to prove that a
￿rm that selects optimally the number of layers never chooses to have intermediate managers with zero
knowledge at any layer. The reason is that these managers cost the ￿rm w but, since they are specialized in
problem solving but cannot solve any problems, they do not add anything to the production process. Under
a restriction on parameters, summarized in Assumption 1, we can guarantee that entrepreneurs and workers
will also have positive knowledge. If the parameter restriction does not hold, it could be the case that either
workers have zero knowledge or workers and entrepreneurs have zero knowledge. This does not change any of
the results that follow, but it does imply that we would need to carry the non-negativity constraints for the
knowledge of workers and entrepreneurs throughout. Hence, we impose Assumption 1 in order to simplify
the exposition.
Assumption 1 The parameters ￿, c, and h are such that c
￿ ￿ h
1￿h:
Proposition 1 shows that Assumption 1 is su¢ cient to guarantee that, for any organization with L 6= 1
management layers, the entrepreneur never sets knowledge to zero at any layer. The intuition of the result
12This assumption is not just a normalization. It determines the boundaries of the hierarchy, and it implies that organizations
cannot be just replicated at the minimum e¢ cient scale by letting nL
L > 1. If we only impose the restriction that the units of
CEO-time is greater than one, nL
L ￿ 1; the cost function would be a step function, with each step at the level of the minimum
e¢ cient scale. Since each agent is endowed with one unit of time, our restriction that nL
L = 1 implies that CEOs are dedicated
to only one ￿rm.
10is as follows. There are two possible ways in which the ￿rm can reduce production, either by decreasing the
knowledge of workers and problem solvers at each layer of the organization, or by reducing the number of
layers of the organization. Assumption 1 guarantees that the cost of communication is large enough relative
to the cost of learning, so the ￿rm always prefers to reduce the number of layers before setting the knowledge
of its employees to zero.
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, for all L 6= 1 and any output level q; the knowledge of agents at all
layers is positive (zl
L ￿ 0 never binds).
All proofs are relegated to the Appendix. The case of L = 1 is the only one where a simple parameter
restriction cannot guarantee that z0
1 > 0. The reason is that an organization with zero management layers is
constrained to produce q < A. Hence, even if workers do not learn anything, an organization with one layer
of managers can dominate the self-employed ￿rm when the quantity produced is close enough to A or larger.
However, all the results below hold for the case of L = 1 as well. With these results in hand, let us set the
Lagrange multiplier for the non-negative knowledge constraint to zero, ￿
l
L = 0 for all l. Strictly speaking we
still could have zero knowledge for q values and layers that are never optimally chosen by the ￿rm. However,
given that these ranges are irrelevant for our purposes, we proceed as if the constraint never binds.
We ￿rst characterize the marginal cost curve given L. Note that the marginal cost of a ￿rm is equal to the












As we can see, the marginal cost is an increasing function of the knowledge of the entrepreneur, zL
L; the
cost of acquiring knowledge relative to the knowledge requirements in production, wc=￿, and communication
technology h. Recall that the higher h is, the worse the communication technology and so the less e¢ cient
are employees at communicating problems. Naturally, the marginal cost is a decreasing function of the level
of technology, A. Proposition 2 below shows that, given the number of layers L, the marginal cost of a ￿rm
is increasing in output, q. The result implies that the knowledge of all agents is increasing in q. That is,
given the number of layers, increasing the quantity produced implies that the chosen organizational structure
becomes more restrictive and so the cost of producing an extra unit increases.
Proposition 2 Given the number of layers L, the marginal cost, MCL (q;w); and the knowledge of all
employees, zl
L for all l; increase with q: Furthermore, MCL (q;w) > 0, for all L and q, and so the cost
function C (q;w) is strictly increasing.
Now consider the change in marginal costs as the ￿rm decides to increase the number of layers. We
show below that when a ￿rm increases the number of layers, it also increases discontinuously the quantity
produced. For now, we consider q￿ s at the point of a switch in layers (when the argmin of (2) increases), and
11study the change in marginal cost as we increase q. Proposition 3 proves that the marginal cost at this point
always jumps down discontinuously. The reason is simple: when the ￿rm increases the number of layers, it
invests in the ability to produce more output. Hence the marginal cost of producing an extra unit decreases.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the entrepreneur ￿nds it optimal to increase the number of layers at output
level q; then the marginal cost decreases discontinuously at q.
Since ￿rms operate in a monopolistic competition environment, this characterization of the marginal cost
is useful to understand how prices di⁄er across organizations. It also reveals that investing in a new layer is
equivalent to expanding the production capacity of the ￿rm.
Let us now study the cost function more generally. From the ￿rst-order conditions we can solve for the
























L are the solutions to the ￿rst-order conditions (3) and (4).13 The average cost function

















The average cost functions for di⁄erent L￿ s all share a number of characteristics. They are all homogeneous
of degree one with respect to factor prices. The two factor prices are cw for knowledge and w for a worker￿ s
time. So this implies that the cost functions are homogeneous of degree one in w. The choice of knowledge
levels is invariant to w, since it a⁄ects all costs proportionally. Finally, the average cost curves are convex
in q. When production is small, an increase in production reduces average costs up to the MES. Further
increases in output increase average cost: The ￿rm needs to provide too much knowledge to agents in the
lower layers of the organization to achieve such a large scale. These results are proven in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 Given the number of layers L; the cost function and the corresponding factor demands
have the following properties: i. The cost function is homogeneous of degree one in w. ii. Conditional factor
demands are homogeneous of degree zero in w: iii. The average cost curve is convex in q, has its minimum
where it crosses the marginal cost curve, and converges to in￿nity when q ! 0 or q ! 1.
Figure 2 illustrates part iii. of Proposition 4. It shows the convex average cost functions for organizations
with one and two layers, together with the corresponding marginal cost curves. It is evident in Figure 2 that
the minima of the average cost curves decrease with the number of layers. We show this result formally in
13The cost function for the case of L = 1 is slightly di⁄erent. In particular,
















12the next proposition. The intuition is that ￿rms with more layers are able to economize on the knowledge
acquisition of their employees by leveraging on the knowledge of its managers at higher scales of output. The
￿rm is paying more ￿ ￿xed￿costs to have a large organization and this allows it to produce at lower average
costs, as long as its scale is large enough.
Proposition 5 The minimum average cost for a given number of layers decreases with the number of
layers.
Figure 3 presents an example of the average cost curves for an organization with up to four layers (L = 3).
As we can see, the minimum average cost is decreasing in the number of layers. Furthermore, the level of
output that minimizes average cost is increasing with the number of layers. This implies that the average
cost curves cross between the MES of the ￿rms with adjacent numbers of layers. This is relevant for our
purposes, since it implies that the average cost function at the MES, and the region around it, will be part
of the lower envelope that determines the average cost curve when the number of layers is optimized as well,























Figure 3: Average cost for several L￿ s Figure 4: The cost function
Proposition 6 The level of output that achieves the MES, q￿
L, increases with the number of layers.







The results we have proven in this section imply that the average cost function that solves the problem in
(2) has the shape illustrated in Figure 4. This curve is the lower envelope of the average cost curves given
the number of layers. It has an overall decreasing shape, but it is not monotone. Increases in q can increase
average costs, since they move the ￿rm away from the MES but not by enough to trigger a change in the
number of layers. Note also that Proposition 6 implies that ￿rms that choose to produce higher quantities
13choose to have a weakly higher number of management layers. The shape of this function is critical in what
follows and for our main results on the impact of trade on organization and productivity.14
Communication technology, h, and the cost of acquiring knowledge about a fraction of problems, c=￿, are
key to determining the average cost function. Figures 5 and 6 show an example of the e⁄ect of changes in
h and c=￿, respectively. First note that in both cases higher h or c=￿ increases the average cost for all q￿ s
beyond L = 0. When the entrepreneur decides to work on her own (L = 0), h plays no role in determining
average costs, since there is no communication inside the ￿rm. In contrast, the average cost curve increases
with c=￿ for all q, including the ones where the entrepreneur decides to be self-employed, since even then
she has to acquire some knowledge. Note also that the higher h or the lower c=￿, the ￿ atter are the average
cost curves beyond layer zero. As we increase the number of layers to more than one, moving beyond the






































Figure 5: Changing h (c=￿ = 1) Figure 6: Changing c=￿ (h = 0.7)
We now turn to the characterization of the cost function when c=￿ ! 0, that is, what happens in this
economy when knowledge becomes either unnecessary to solve problems or extremely cheap. Remember that
the role of organization in our economy is to economize on the acquisition and communication of knowledge.
In this case organization has no purpose. This implies that there would be no ￿rm with more than two
layers. Firms would still have two layers instead of one because otherwise their production is limited to A.
In fact, if we eliminate the possibility of self-employment, one can show that in this limit the cost function is
as in Krugman (1980) or Melitz (2003) with an additional ￿xed cost. Namely, the marginal cost is constant,
14Consider the case in which ￿rms can choose continuously their number of layers. Then, the average cost function would
be the lower envelope of average cost functions that change continuously. In fact, the average cost function would be formed
only by the minimum of the average costs. Since we know that the minimum of the average cost is decreasing in the number
of layers, the resulting average and marginal cost functions would be continuous and strictly decreasing in quantities. Such a
model is a straightforward extension of our setup, but the interpretation of a continuum of layers is challenging and hard to
reconcile with reality, since we observe ￿rms choosing a discrete and small number of layers or classes of employees (as well as
plants, products, etc.). Hence, this extension eliminates an essential part of a ￿rm￿ s organizational problem: namely, the many
discrete decisions of ￿rms.
14the average cost is decreasing due to ￿xed costs, and the cost function involves a ￿xed cost plus a variable
cost equal to output times the marginal cost. Hence, in the limit without self-employment, our technology
includes the standard technology used in trade models as a special case. Overall, since the model speci￿cation
that follows is identical to that in Melitz (2003), with heterogeneity in demand rather than in marginal costs,
the special case of our model when c=￿ ! 0 and when self-employment is not an option is isomorphic to
Melitz (2003).15 The result is proven in Proposition 7.
Proposition 7 In the limit when c=￿ ! 0 and L ￿ 1, the cost function is given by




















Measuring productivity at the ￿rm level involves more than just looking at marginal costs. The ￿rm is
using labor and knowledge as inputs in production. Hence, to measure productivity we need to aggregate
variable factors. Of course, the cost function gives us an appropriate way to do so. Throughout, we measure
the productivity of a ￿rm producing a quantity q, a(q), as the inverse of variable average costs, that is,
average costs without considering the ￿xed costs of production. This is done by taking the inverse of the AC
function we de￿ned and characterized above, but setting the wage to one (since the input bundle is measured









where the average cost is net of any ￿xed costs of production.
It is informative to calculate what this measure of productivity implies for the case of Proposition 7 in
which c=￿ ! 0 and L ￿ 1. In this limit the model generates another ￿xed cost, so total ￿xed costs are
given by w(1 + f). Since the cost function, as we de￿ned it above, includes w but not wf, we just need to
15The need to eliminate the possibility of self-employment to obtain the standard technology arises from the fact that when
L = 0 the entrepreneur can act as manager and worker at the same time. Allowing for self-employment would amount to having
an extra technology in Melitz (2003) where a ￿rm can produce up to A without paying the ￿xed cost of production. In this










if q ￿ A
:
15subtract w. Hence, the inverse of the average cost function net of ￿xed costs is
a(q) =
q








That is, in the case where the marginal cost is given by w=A, our measure of productivity results in exactly
A. Hence, for this case our measure of productivity coincides exactly with the one in Melitz (2003) and
others. Clearly when c=￿ > 0, productivity is not solely determined by A but is a function of how much
the ￿rm produces (and the corresponding organizational structure) given its demand draw ￿, as well as
communication and information technology. That is, in our framework, di⁄erences in demand are mapped
into di⁄erences in technology via the organizational decisions of the ￿rm.
2.2. Pro￿t Maximization
Consider the pro￿t maximization problem of an entrepreneur with demand draw ￿ and the cost function,
C (q;w), discussed in the previous section. The entrepreneur chooses the quantity supplied in the market
and its price subject to her demand draw. Households have the iso-elastic preferences in (1), and so the
demand schedule faced by an entrepreneur with draw ￿ is given by







where R denotes total revenues in the economy, q (￿) = ~ Nx(￿), since quantity produced is equal to the
quantity demanded by each agent times the number of agents, and P denotes the ideal price index, which
we normalize to one throughout. The problem of an entrepreneur with draw ￿ is
￿ (￿) = max
q(￿)￿0
~ ￿ (q (￿);w) = max
q(￿)￿0
p(￿)q (￿) ￿ C (q (￿);w) ￿ wf; (7)




￿ and where f denotes the ￿xed costs of production. The ￿rst-order condition
of this problem is
((￿ ￿ 1)=￿)q (￿)
￿1=￿ (￿R)
1=￿ ￿ MC (q (￿);w) = 0;




MC (q (￿);w): (8)
In contrast to standard models, here the marginal cost, and therefore the price, depend on the quantity
produced. The quantity supplied is then implicitly determined by







Denote ￿rm revenue by r(￿), then







16Firms with di⁄erent ￿￿ s charge di⁄erent prices and supply di⁄erent quantities of goods to the market.
It is easy to show using equation (9) and Propositions 2 and 3 that q (￿) is an increasing function of ￿.
Furthermore, when the ￿rm decides to increase the number of layers, the marginal cost falls discontinuously
and so q (￿) jumps up. The elasticity of quantity with respect to the decline in marginal cost as we change
the number of layers is given by ￿￿, and the elasticity of the price with respect to the jump in marginal cost
is one. In fact, since the price is proportional to marginal costs, it is increasing in ￿ given a number of layers
L + 1 and jumps down when the ￿rm increases the number of layers. Hence, prices are not monotone in ￿,
which implies that larger ￿rms (￿rms with higher ￿ and therefore q (￿)) do not necessarily charge higher or
lower prices.
Proposition 8 The quantity produced, q (￿), and revenue, r(￿), increase continuously with ￿ for a given
number of layers and increase discontinuously when the ￿rm increases the number of layers. The price,
p(￿), increases continuously with ￿ for a given number of layers and decreases discontinuously when the
￿rm increases the number of layers.
The previous result is intuitive. Given ￿, the entrepreneur decides the number of layers of the organization.
The pricing rule is to set prices such that marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost. As we increase ￿, the
marginal revenue schedule changes and the entrepreneur re-optimizes, ￿nding in some cases pro￿t maximizing
to restructure the organization and increase the number of layers. Consider an ￿, say ^ ￿; such that the
entrepreneur is just indi⁄erent between producing with L or with L + 1 layers. Note that by Proposition
3, the organization with L + 1 layers has a lower marginal cost than the organization with L layers at ^ ￿:
This implies that the quantity supplied under organization L cannot be the optimal quantity supplied under
organization L + 1: In particular, since the L + 1 organization has a lower marginal cost, the entrepreneur
produces a quantity at which the marginal revenue is lower: thus a higher quantity. Therefore, the quantity
supplied under organization L is lower than under organization L + 1: A parallel logic then implies the
corresponding changes in prices and quantities proven in Proposition 8.
The pro￿ts of a ￿rm after obtaining a demand realization ￿ (so not including the cost of entry) are then
given by,












L (￿) + 1 + f
￿
; (11)
where ￿ (￿) = ~ ￿ (q (￿);w) for the function q (￿) solves the ￿xed point in (9). Note that since C (￿;w) is not
strictly convex due to changes in the number of layers, in order to maximize pro￿ts we need to maximize the
pro￿ts given a number of layers and then compare these local maxima to determine the global maxima of
the overall pro￿t function. It is easy to prove that the pro￿t function for each individual layer is concave and
so the local maxima of the problem in (7) are well de￿ned and determined by the ￿rst-order conditions of
the problem. Note also that since we are comparing local optima that change continuously with ￿, revenues
and pro￿ts are continuous and increasing in ￿. We prove these results in Proposition 9.
17Proposition 9 Given L; the pro￿t function ~ ￿ (q (￿);w) is strictly concave in q. Furthermore, ￿ (￿) is
increasing and continuous in ￿.
An example of the pro￿ts of a ￿rm as a function of q is plotted in Figure 7 for di⁄erent values of ￿. Clearly
~ ￿ (0;w) = ￿w(1 + f) and limq!1 ~ ￿ (q;w) = ￿1. Hence, as is clear from the ￿gure, the pro￿t function
has a local maximum for each L: As we increase ￿; the maximum of these local maxima determines the
optimal number of layers. The ￿gure illustrates cases in which the global maximum is achieved with one,
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Figure 7: Pro￿ts as a function of ￿
2.3. Equilibrium in the Closed Economy
Entrepreneurs pay a ￿xed cost of entry fE; in units of labor, that allows them to take a draw from the
known distributions of ￿￿ s, G(￿): We let G(￿) be a Pareto distribution with coe¢ cient ￿, so G(￿) = 1￿￿￿￿.
Let ME denote the total mass of ￿rms that enter in a given period. Firms that enter decide whether to
produce or exit. Let M denote the mass of ￿rms operating in equilibrium. Each period a fraction ￿ of
operating ￿rms exits and is replaced by the same number of new entrants.
The value of operating a ￿rm with draw ￿ is then given by














where ￿ (￿) is given by (11). Note that the ￿xed cost of production determines a cuto⁄ level ￿ ￿ such that
￿rms with ￿ > ￿ ￿ produce. In particular, the marginal ￿rm, ￿ ￿; makes zero pro￿ts. Thus, the zero cuto⁄
pro￿t condition for the marginal ￿rm de￿nes the threshold ￿ ￿,
￿ (￿ ￿) = 0: (12)
18Of the mass of new entrants, the fraction that operates is [1 ￿ G(￿ ￿)]ME. In a stationary equilibrium, the
new entrants replace the number of ￿rms that exist, and so
[1 ￿ G(￿ ￿)]ME = ￿M;
where M denotes the total number of active ￿rms. Conditional on entry, the distribution of ￿ is given by
￿(￿) = g (￿)=[1 ￿ G(￿ ￿)] if ￿ > ￿ ￿ and ￿(￿) = 0 otherwise, where g (￿) is the density of G(￿).
Free entry implies that the expected pro￿ts are zero accounting for the entry costs, that is
Z 1
0





g (￿)d￿ = wfE: (13)
In equilibrium, labor markets clear. Labor is used for several purposes, as workers and managers in a
￿rm, as teachers to train workers and managers, and in order to design new products and cover the ￿xed
costs of production. Since the total mass of agents in the economy is given by ~ N, the labor market clearing
condition is given by
~ N =
M





(C (q (￿);1) + f)g (￿)d￿
￿
: (14)
Finally, equilibrium in the goods market implies that
R = w ~ N: (15)
The general equilibrium of this economy is characterized by the demand threshold of the ￿rm that obtains
zero pro￿ts, ￿ ￿, real wages, w, revenue R, and the mass of ￿rms that operate M. Remember that we have
normalized the price index P to one. These four equilibrium variables are obtained by solving the four
equations above, namely, (12), (13), (14), and (15). First note that R can be obtained immediately given
w from (15). Note further that since the mass of ￿rms, M, does not enter equations (12) and (13), we can
solve ￿rst for ￿ ￿ and w, using (12) and (13), and later obtain M from (14). The next proposition shows that
there exists a unique equilibrium in this economy.
Proposition 10 There exists a unique stationary equilibrium.
The proof of Proposition 10 characterizes the schedules of wages and entry thresholds that satisfy the
equilibrium conditions (12) and (13). We show that the schedule implied by the zero cuto⁄ pro￿t condition
starts at zero and is strictly increasing. That is, equation (12) implies that, as we increase wages, fewer ￿rms
enter, since their pro￿ts decrease. In contrast, the schedule de￿ned by the free entry condition implies that,
when all ￿rms enter, the wage is positive. Since in the limit where no ￿rm enters wages have to be zero, the
curves have to cross.
A stationary equilibrium of this economy exhibits a useful property. In equilibrium an increase in total
population from ~ N to ~ N0 leads to higher wages given by w0 =
￿
~ N0= ~ N
￿ 1
￿￿1
w, but does not change the entry
threshold ￿ ￿ or the quantities produced. Hence, we can easily show that in equilibrium higher population
leads to higher prices, revenues and operating pro￿ts of active ￿rms. In fact, prices, revenues and pro￿ts all
19change proportionally by the factor
￿
~ N0= ~ N
￿ 1
￿￿1
. Of course, as is standard in this literature, these changes
come from the gain in variety associated with the higher population and the increase in the number of ￿rms
that the increase in population triggers. The organizational structure enters the result only in that it leads
to a cost function that is homogeneous of degree one in wages. However, since quantities produced are not
a⁄ected by increases in ~ N, the organizational structure of ￿rms is una⁄ected.
Proposition 11 In equilibrium a larger population size does not a⁄ect the entry threshold or the quantities
produced (and therefore the organizational structure), but increases the wages, prices, revenues and operating
pro￿ts of all active ￿rms.
3. OPEN ECONOMY
Consider now an economy with a domestic (D) and a foreign (F) country, which can trade with each other.
Throughout, we assume that the demand draw of a ￿rm applies to both markets. That is, tastes are identical
across countries. Entrepreneurs in each country decide how much to supply to the local market and how
much to sell abroad. Entrepreneurs in the domestic country pay a ￿xed cost fDD to produce. If they want
to supply the foreign market they also need to pay a ￿xed cost fDF. Similarly, ￿rms in the foreign country
need to pay a ￿xed cost fFF to produce and fFD to export. Trading goods is costly. Let ￿DF = ￿FD > 1
be the ￿ iceberg￿trade cost incurred by ￿rms. These costs entail a physical loss of resources. Finally, ~ Ni
for i = D;F denotes the ￿xed supply of labor in country i. As a result of the ￿xed cost of production and
exporting, there exist thresholds ￿ ￿ij such that if ￿ < ￿ ￿ij, the entrepreneur ￿ from country i does not ￿nd
it pro￿table to supply to market j; and vice versa.
Let xij (￿) be the demand of an agent in country j for goods ￿ produced in country i for i;j 2 fF;Dg,
and pij (￿) denotes its price. Since agents now have access to goods from both countries, the preferences in
(1) become



















for i;j 2 fF;Dg, where ￿ ￿ij is the demand draw of the marginal ￿rm that supplies goods to market j from
market i: Mi now denotes the number of operating ￿rms in market i and ￿ji (￿) = g (￿)=(1 ￿ G(￿ ￿ji)) is
the conditional distribution of varieties available in market i and produced in country j.




pii (￿)xii (￿)￿ii (￿)d￿ + Mj
Z 1
￿ ￿ji
pji (￿)xji (￿)￿ji (￿)d￿ = wi:
Then, total demand for country j￿ s products in country i is given by






















As before, we normalize the price index of the domestic country to one, so PD = 1:
Consider ￿rst the problem of a ￿rm with demand draw ￿ in country i that does not export. It solves,
￿ii (￿) ￿ max
xii
n
pii (￿) ~ Nixii (￿) ￿ C (qi;wi) ￿ wifii
o
subject to (16). For ￿rms that supply only to the domestic market, qi (￿) = ~ Nixii (￿), and so the ￿rst-order
condition is given by














Denote by ￿ij (￿) the pro￿ts of a ￿rm with demand draw ￿ in country i that sells in the domestic and
foreign markets. The pro￿t maximization problem becomes
￿ij (￿) ￿ max
(xii;xij)￿0
n
pii (￿) ~ Nixii (￿) + pij (￿) ~ Njxij (￿) ￿ C (qi (￿);wi) ￿ wi (fii + fij)
o
subject to (16) and where total production is given by
qi (￿) = qii (￿) + qij (￿) = ~ Nixii (￿) + ￿ij ~ Njxij (￿); (19)
where qij (￿) denotes the quantity produced by i for market j. The cost function C (￿;wi) solves the cost
minimization problem described in Section 2. The ￿rst-order conditions of this problem implicitly de￿ne the
quantities sold in each market,



















In contrast with the standard model, xii (￿) and xij (￿) enter the marginal cost function through qi (￿) as
well. That is, a ￿rm￿ s level of total production a⁄ects its marginal cost and therefore how much it sells
in each market. Importantly, the decision to export a⁄ects the cost of production of the goods sold in the





￿ijMC (qi (￿);wi) = pii (￿)￿ij:
16This implies that even when fij > fii all ￿rms in the economy could enter the exporting market. Of course, if fij is large
enough, then only the most productive ￿rms will export. This is a key distinction with Melitz (2003) where, for the case of two
symmetric countries, all ￿rms will export if and only if fij ￿ fii.
213.1. Equilibrium in the Open Economy
As in the closed economy, the zero pro￿t condition for the marginal ￿rm de￿nes the threshold of entering
￿rms in country i, ￿ ￿ii: So, ￿ii (￿ ￿ii) ￿ 0. Similarly, indi⁄erence between exporting or selling domestically
de￿nes the threshold to export ￿ ￿ij, so ￿ij (￿ ￿ij) = maxf0;￿ii (￿ ￿ij)g. In parallel to the closed economy, the










g (￿)d￿ = wifE
i ;
where fE
i denotes the ￿xed cost of entry in market i. Labor market clearing is guaranteed by
~ Ni =
Mi









All these conditions hold for i 6= j and i;j 2 fD;Fg: Finally, goods market clearing is guaranteed by
Ri = wiNi for i 2 fD;Fg: It is easy to show that the labor market clearing condition, the free entry
condition, and the price index normalization together imply that trade is balanced. An equilibrium is then
given by a vector (￿ ￿DD; ￿ ￿DF; ￿ ￿FF; ￿ ￿FD;MD;MF;PD;PF;wD;wF;RD;RF), which solves the 8 conditions
above together with the two goods market clearing conditions, PD = 1; and PF determined by (17).
The next proposition guarantees gains from trade as well as an increase in the quantity produced of all
exporters and a decline in the quantity produced of all non-exporters. Given that we are normalizing PD = 1,
wD measures welfare in the domestic country. Now consider the e⁄ect of an increase in wi on the quantity
produced of non-exporters. We can use equation (18) after substituting Ri = wiNi to study the e⁄ect of wi
on qi (￿). Note ￿rst that as shown in Proposition 4, MC (￿;wi) = wiMC (￿;1): Hence, an increase in wages
increases the right-hand side of equation (18) since ￿ > 1. If the marginal cost did not depend on qi (￿),
this would immediately imply that the quantity produced by non-exporters would decrease. In our model
there are two other e⁄ects. Consider ￿rst the case of a ￿rm that does not change the number of layers as a
result of the change in wages. In this case the direct e⁄ect of wi is dampened by the fact that the decrease
in qi (￿) decreases marginal costs as proven in Proposition 2, which makes ￿rms produce more. However,
this new e⁄ect can never dominate the ￿rst, since it operates through the original e⁄ect on qi (￿). If the
original e⁄ect is strong enough, or the ￿rm is close to switching layers, the original e⁄ect may trigger ￿rms
to decrease their number of layers. In this second case, the original decline in qi (￿) as a result of the rise in
wi increases discretely the marginal cost of the ￿rm, which reinforces the direct e⁄ect and makes the ￿rm sell
even less. So the response of quantities produced as a response of changes in wages relative to the standard
model is dampened for ￿rms that do not change the number of layers and ampli￿ed for ￿rms that do. The
same logic applies to the domestic sales of exporting ￿rms, although exporters now have access to a new
market. Using Proposition 11, we can prove that access to this new market always increases their sales.
Proposition 12 In equilibrium a trade liberalization increases welfare in both countries. Furthermore, the
22quantity produced of all non-exporters decreases and the quantity produced of all exporters increases.
Proposition 12 is useful to understand the e⁄ect of trade on ￿rm productivity and the internal organization
of ￿rms, particularly since in Section 2 we characterized the cost minimization of ￿rms as a function of their
quantity produced. The increase in the quantity produced of exporters implies that they increase weakly
the number of layers of management. Exporters that do not change the number of layers exhibit a higher
marginal cost. These e⁄ects are reversed for non-exporters. Productivity is equal to the inverse of average
costs at a wage equal to one, as described in Section 2.1.1. Hence, the productivity of exporters can increase
or decrease depending on a ￿rm￿ s production relative to the MES of its number of layers. Opening trade to a
larger country, which increases sales further tends to raise productivity as it increases layers of management
and moves producers to average cost curves with lower minima. Hence, on average, productivity tends to
increase for exporters. Non-exporters could also gain or lose in terms of productivity. The smallest ￿rms
always become less productive. Others might become more productive, since they get closer to the MES of
their chosen L. The average cost curve has a general convex shape, which implies that the productivity gains
that result from opening to trade are larger for small exporters than for large exporters (although there are
￿rms that increase and others that decrease their productivity).17
Corollary 13 A trade liberalization increases weakly the number of management layers of all exporters
and decreases weakly the number of layers of all non-exporters.
Corollary 13 is the direct result of Propositions 6 and 12. All exporters produce more after a trade
liberalization and ￿rms that produce more minimize their cost when they have weakly more management
layers. The converse is true for non-exporters. This corollary and Proposition 12 partially characterize the
e⁄ect of a trade liberalization. However, since the response of ￿rm productivity and other ￿rm characteristics
is heterogeneous, we turn now to a calibrated version of the model where we study a richer set of ￿rm
responses. We do this in the following section.
4. CALIBRATION AND COMPARATIVE STATICS
For the quantitative exercises presented below we require values of the following set of parameters: fE
i ;
fii; fij; h; c=￿; ￿; ￿; A; ~ Ni; ￿; ￿ij: We specialize the model to a world with two symmetric countries and
calibrate the parameters such that the model matches several moments in the U.S. data for 2002. We use
the reference values in the literature for the parameters ￿, ￿, and tij: We set the elasticity of substitution to
3:8 following Bernard, et al. (2003) and Ghironi and Melitz (2005). For the level of trade costs, ￿, we use 1:3
and for the exogenous ￿rm exit rate we use 10%; both values obtained from Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and
17The heterogeneous response of ￿rm productivity in our model imply that average productivity can increase or decrease
depending on the distribution of ￿￿ s. We show below that for the calibrated economy with a Pareto distribution of ￿￿ s, the
general shape of the average cost function leads to an average productivity gain for exporters and average productivity loss for
non-exporters.
23used for the U.S. for 2002. We set ~ Ni equal to the total number of employees in the manufacturing sector
and the educational sector as described below.
We normalize fii = 1:1 and calibrate the values of fE
i ;fij;h;c=￿, A and ￿ to match ￿ve moments in the
U.S. data and the Pareto coe¢ cient of the size distribution of ￿rms producing manufactured goods in the
U.S. The moments that we match are the share of expenditure on domestic goods, total expenditure, the
fraction of ￿rms that export, the average size of ￿rms, and the share of education employees in the economy.
The fraction of ￿rms that export is not directly reported in the U.S. Census Bureau. Bernard, et al. (2007)
estimate that 18% of the U.S. manufacturing ￿rms exported in 2002. We use this ￿gure since we restrict our
attention to the manufacturing sector.
In the model some of the labor used in production is used to train workers. In order to take this into
account we create a sector that is a bundle of the manufacturing sector and the share of the educational
services sector used in the manufacturing sector. To do so, we ￿rst calculate the share of education employees
using the ￿gures reported by the Career Guide to Industries (CGI) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
Current Population Survey for 2008. The CGI reports the number of employees per occupations in di⁄erent
industries.18 The total fraction amounts to 11.8% of total private employment in 2008. We calculate the
share of total gross production from the education sector using the STAN - OECD database for Structural
Analysis. We apply these shares to the manufacturing sector measures of employees and gross production.
In this way we obtain that ~ N = 16:48 million.19
The average ￿rm size is calculated as the total number of employees over the total number of ￿rms from
the manufacturing sector.20 The total number of workers from the manufacturing sector reported by the
2002 Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB) from the U.S. Census Bureau is 14,393,609 and the total number
of manufacturing ￿rms is 318,126. Therefore, the average size is 45.24. Finally, we use the TRAINS database
to obtain data on imports from the manufacturing sector and the STAN database for gross production from
the bundled sector. We ￿nd that the share of expenditure on domestic goods is 78.9% and total expenditure
is equal to $5.1 billion.
We search over the parameter space for parameter values that match the discussed moments, using as
a loss function the norm of the percentage deviation di⁄erence between the model and the data. Table 1
presents the moment conditions that we match and the values they take in our preferred calibration.
The calibrated parameter values are presented in Table 2. The cost of knowledge, c=￿, and the commu-
nication technology, h, satisfy Assumption 1. Hence, in the calibrated exercises there are no ￿rm with zero
knowledge at any layer. In the previous section we suggested an alternative interpretation for the per period
cost of knowledge c; it can be reinterpreted as ~ c￿M where ~ c is the cost of training workers in an economy
18We calculate the share of education employees by the number of workers in the Educational Services sector over total
private employment in the year 2008.
19We apply the share of education employees from 2008 to the total number of employees in the manufacturing sector in 2002
since the ￿gure for 2002 is not available on the CGI website.
20Note that we do not include the education workers as part of the manufacturing sector in order to calculate the average
size of ￿rms. We also do not include them in the moment calculated in the model.
24where only new workers have to be trained every period and ￿M is the the annual death rate. The U.S.
death rate is 0.008% and so the cost of training new workers takes a value of 28, implying a stock of human
capital equivalent to 4 times the population of the economy.21
Table 1: Calibrated moments
Moments Data Model
Share of ￿rms that export 18.0 17.53
Average size of ￿rms 45.2 45.44
Share of education employees 11.8 11.85
Share of expenditure on domestic goods 78.9 74.94
Total expenditure 5.1 5.10
Size distribution of ￿rms, Pareto coe¢ cient -1.095 -1.094
We now describe our results. Figure 8 presents productivity as a function of the idiosyncratic demand
parameter ￿ for the case of the calibrated open economy and an economy in autarky with identical fun-
damental parameter values. Throughout, all light curves refer to the implications of the model in autarky
and dark curves refer to the calibrated open economy. The vertical lines in the graph mark the thresholds
￿ ￿ < ￿ ￿DD = ￿ ￿FF < ￿ ￿DF = ￿ ￿DF. Namely, they mark the entry threshold in autarky, the entry threshold
in the two trading economies, and the export threshold in both economies. The ￿gure shows productivity,
measured as q (￿)=C (q (￿);1); and illustrates how the productivity of ￿rms changes as we move to the open
economy. As in any model with ￿xed exporting costs, only the ￿rms with high enough ￿￿ s export, and some
￿rms exit as we open the economy.
Table 2: Parameter values
Parameters A fE fij ￿ c=￿ h
Values 0.26 35.1 5.4 0.9 0.225 0.26
Among the ￿rms that enter in both scenarios, the ones with the lowest demand realizations experience
a reduction in productivity as a result of the trade liberalization. They sell less, at higher prices, and
obtain less pro￿ts. Note the di⁄erence with the standard model in which trade liberalization has no e⁄ect
on productivity and productivity is identical for all ￿rms (given our setup with exogenous heterogeneity in
demand, not productivity). As ￿ increases from its lowest values, productivity increases in both scenarios,
since ￿rms are still producing below the MES of a ￿rm with two layers (in this calibration all ￿rms have at
least two layers). Firms in autarky reach the MES of a two-layer organization for a lower ￿ than in the open
economy (as implied by Corollary 13). Hence, as ￿ increases further, some non-exporting ￿rms experience a
gain in productivity.
21The Pareto coe¢ cient that matched the size distribution of ￿rms has a value lower than 1; therefore, the mean and the
variance of the distribution are not well-de￿ned. Nevertheless, since the support of the distribution used in the computations
is ￿nite, all the moments we compute are well de￿ned.
25The relationship is reversed once the ￿rms change to an organization with three layers. At this point the
discontinuous increase in q (￿) leads to a discontinuous change in the cost, which results in a discontinuity
in productivity (recall Proposition 8). As we move beyond the export threshold ￿ ￿DF, the productivity of
exporting ￿rms jumps up discretely in the open economy. The jump implies an increase in productivity for
the marginal ￿rm of 1%. Firms with ￿￿ s just before the threshold experience a loss in productivity as a
result of trade and ￿rms with ￿￿ s just after the threshold experience a gain. Since exporting ￿rms switch
layers for smaller ￿￿ s than in autarky, there are some large exporting ￿rms that lose productivity as a result
of trade. Our parameterization of the model implies that, as ￿rms get larger and have more layers, the gains



























Figure 8: Productivity for all ￿ in autarky and open economy
Figure 8 illustrates clearly the heterogeneous responses in productivity as a result of a trade liberalization
from autarky to the calibrated economy. In general, the e⁄ects on productivity are below 1%. However, note
that these changes in productivity would not exist if we were to move from autarky to an economy without
any ￿xed trade costs (see Figure 15 below). In that case, opening to trade would amount to an increase
in population that raises wages, and the number of ￿rms. In contrast, it leaves the quantities produced,
and therefore the organizational structure and productivity, unchanged (see Proposition 11). Hence, the
productivity implications of our model are the result of the reorganization of production given the change
in q (￿) generated by the presence of ￿xed and variable trade costs.
22These features are a consequence of agents learning the most routine problems ￿rst, namely, a distribution of problems
with decreasing density.
26Figure 9 presents four plots with the main ￿rm outcomes. The upper-left plot presents the average cost
function in both scenarios. For the range of ￿￿ s presented, ￿rms have between two and four layers and the
marginal ￿rms that export have three layers. Note how the average cost function becomes ￿ atter as we
increase ￿, which implies that the gains from organizational change beyond four layers are minimal. The
main di⁄erence between the average cost functions in both scenarios is their level. This change is the result
of an increase of 8:1% in wages in the open economy relative to autarky, which increases average costs.
The lower-left panel presents ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts, which, as expected, are monotonically increasing in ￿. Pro￿ts
decrease for all non-exporters and some of the marginal exporters, and increase for the large exporters. These
e⁄ects are standard in the literature and remain in our setup. The upper-right ￿gure presents production.
Non-exporters produce more in autarky than in the open economy and the di⁄erence is larger for ￿rms that
change layers. Exporters produce more overall, again with the di⁄erence between trade and autarky larger
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Figure 9. Average cost, production, pro￿ts and prices
The upper-right panel of Figure 9 also presents production for the export and domestic markets. Exporters
produce less for the domestic market than in autarky. Note the increase in production as a result of trade.
This is the main e⁄ect that leads to the productivity gains that we have underscored here. The bottom-
right ￿gure presents the domestic prices charged by all ￿rms (foreign prices are just multiplied by ￿DF).
Propositions 2 and 3 describe the behavior of the marginal cost as a function of q (￿) and, as we discussed
27in Section 3, our CES demand system leads to prices that are proportional to marginal costs. Since q (￿) is
increasing in ￿ as we saw in the upper-right panel, we know that prices increase with ￿. Note that in the
standard model domestic prices would be constant in ￿. As ￿rms change layers, prices fall discontinuously
as described in Proposition 8. The price function also becomes ￿ atter as we increase the number of layers
and eventually converges to a constant as we let ￿ ! 1. Note also the jump in prices for the marginal
exporting ￿rm in the open economy. This is the result of the jump in quantity, which increases its marginal
cost and therefore its price. We can also calculate revenue productivity by multiplying our productivity
measure by the relevant prices. Of course, revenue productivity will also re￿ ect the increase in prices that
results from the increase in wages. The jump in prices for the marginal exporting ￿rm together with our
analysis of Figure 9 implies that revenue productivity in this economy increases by more than productivity.
The overall increase in revenue productivity for the marginal ￿rm that exports is equal to 1.82%.
Figure 10 shows the impact of moving from autarky to the calibrated economy for the distribution of
￿rm sizes, knowledge, income, and productivities. The upper-left panel presents the distribution of ￿rm￿ s
employment size and how it ￿ts the data. We plot the size distribution using a standard log-log plot of the
cumulative distribution in which a Pareto distribution would appear as a straight line with slope of minus
its shape coe¢ cient. As is evident from the ￿gure, the model does a nice job in ￿tting the distribution of
￿rm sizes. This is, of course, partly the result of our assumption that the idiosyncratic demand shocks are
distributed Pareto and the fact that we are calibrating the shape parameter of this distribution to ￿t the
data. However, the ￿t is by no means guaranteed in a model as rich as this. It is clear from the ￿gure that
in autarky ￿rm sizes are smaller and the tail of the distribution is thinner, indicating fewer large ￿rms.
The upper-right panel of Figure 10 presents a histogram of the distribution of knowledge in the economy
in our two scenarios. The ￿gure indicates that there are substantially more workers with low levels of
knowledge in the open economy, although there are more agents with intermediate levels of knowledge. The
e⁄ect is the result of the increased number of layers of exporting ￿rms in the open economy. These ￿rms
introduce more layers and, as a result, require their workers to know less. However, since they hire more
intermediate managers, there is more mass of agents with intermediate levels of knowledge than in autarky.
The agents with the highest levels of knowledge are all entrepreneurs and are present in both economies.
The lower-left panel of Figure 10 presents the distribution of income. The distribution of income follows






that wi increases as we open the economy, which shifts the distribution of income in the open economy to
the right relative to the closed economy.
Finally, the lower-right panel presents the distribution of productivities in the economy. The ￿gure shows
that the fraction of small productivity ￿rms in both economies remains largely unchanged. Recall from
Figure 8 that the productivity of the smallest ￿rms decreases, but the entry threshold also shifts to the right.
Hence, since the shape of the Pareto distribution of ￿￿ s is invariant to truncation, we obtain similar shares
of small productivity ￿rms in both economies. The main di⁄erence between this conclusion and the one we
28reached discussing Figure 8 is that the latter conditions on ￿ while the former does not. The ￿gure also
illustrates the increase in the mass of the most productive ￿rms as we open to trade. Essentially, ￿rms in the
middle of the distribution increase their productivity, thereby raising the mass at the tail. This is the main
e⁄ect of a trade liberalization: it makes ￿rms with intermediate levels of demand more productive than in
autarky because it incentivizes a reorganization of the ￿rm.






























Size distribution of firms
 
 








































































 Data Pareto coefficient
Data = -1.095
Open     = -1.094
Autarky  = -1.204
Average productivity
Open       = 0.1845
Autarky    = 0.1839
Change   = 0.302 %
Average knowledge level
Open       = 0.859
Autarky    = 0.857
Change   = 0.253 % 
Coefficient of variation
Open      =  68.1 %
Autarky   =  71.1 %
Average income
Open    = 36937
Autarky = 34156
Change = 8.14 %
Coefficient of variation
Open    = 11.0 %
Autarky = 11.5 %
Figure 10: Firm size, knowledge, income, and productivity distributions
4.1. E⁄ects of Trade on Internal Organization
So far our discussion has been limited to ￿rms￿and economy-wide changes in outcomes as we open to trade.
We now turn to describe the internal reorganization of ￿rms. Exporters that do not change layers increase
the knowledge, income, and number of employees at all layers, while non-exporters decrease them. Figure
11 presents examples of the reorganization of a non-exporter and an exporter that change their number of
layers as the economy opens to trade. Each layer is represented by a rectangle where the height represents
29the knowledge of workers in that layer, and the length represents the number of agents working in that layer.
We plot rectangles in higher layers above rectangles in lower ones.


















Hierarchy of an non-exporter given 






























































Hierarchy of an ex-post exporter given 
Figure 11: Changes in the organizational design after a trade liberalization
Compare ￿rst the two upper panels in the ￿gure, which represent a ￿rm with given demand level, ￿;
that does not export as a result of the trade liberalization. The change in the characteristics of the ￿rm is
dramatic. The ￿rm reduces the number of layers from three to two. This implies a reduction in the number
of workers (agents in layer zero) from 21 to 12. Note that the main reason to have an intermediate layer is to
increase the span of control of the entrepreneur. Since in autarky the ￿rm also hired 3 agents in the second
layer, the total employment size of the ￿rm went from 25 to 13. The levels of knowledge also changed. In
the open economy, employees at each comparable layer of the ￿rm know more. Worker￿ s knowledge increases
by 109%, while the knowledge of managers in the ￿rst-layer increases by 182%. Since the ￿rm has one less
30layer, the ￿rm as a whole solves fewer of the problems faced in production as the cumulative knowledge of
the ￿rm decreases by 10%.
These implications reverse when we look at the exporter represented in the two lower panels. Now, the
number of layers increases as we open to trade, and so does the number of employees in the ￿rm. However,
the amount of knowledge of agents in each comparable layer decreases. Workers￿ s knowledge decreases by
12%; that of ￿rst-layer managers decreases by 28% and that of second-layer managers decreases by 67%.
Still, since the ￿rm has one more layer, its cumulative knowledge increases by 4%. The ￿rm decides to
decrease the knowledge of agents at all comparable layers in order to economize on the knowledge of the
many workers and lower-level managers in the ￿rm. The organizational changes described in Figure 11 are
present for all ￿rms that adjust the number of layers. Of course, these changes in the levels of knowledge,
are mapped directly into changes in the distribution of income within the ￿rm.
Figure 11 presents an example of changes in organization but does not allow us to describe these changes
across the universe of ￿rms. To do so, we introduce the concept of autonomy as used in Bloom, et al. (2010).
In a model of management by exception, like ours, autonomy of a class of workers can be measured by the
share of the decisions they make relative to the total set of decisions made by the ￿rm. That is, we can
measure the set of problems solved by agents in a given layer, relative to the total amount of knowledge
in the ￿rm. So z‘
L=ZL
L measures the autonomy of agents in layer ‘. Hence, zL
L=ZL
L measures the share of
knowledge of the entrepreneur, or its autonomy. Of course, the larger the autonomy of the entrepreneur, the
more centralized the decision making in the ￿rm.
Figure 12 presents the measures of autonomy for agents working in di⁄erent layers as a function of the
demand draw of the ￿rm, ￿: Focus ￿rst on the lower-right panel that presents the autonomy of entrepreneurs,
or the level of centralized decision making at the ￿rm. The ￿gure shows a clear pattern. The level of
centralized decision making is decreasing in ￿ and it decreases discontinuously as ￿rms add more layers.
Furthermore, a trade liberalization increases the level of centralization for all non-exporters and decreases it
for all exporters. So the model delivers a clear testable implication for this key dimension of the organization
of the ￿rm. Bloom, et al. (2010) present evidence that decentralization tends to fall with ￿rm size, as
predicted by our theory. As far as we know, the empirical literature has not studied the e⁄ect of a trade
liberalization on centralization.
The other panels in the ￿gure present the autonomy of workers, ￿rst-layer managers (denoted as middle
managers) and second-layer managers (denoted as upper-middle managers). The upper-left panel in Figure
12 shows the autonomy of workers. Firms with low ￿￿ s have only two layers (note how in the lower-left panel
there are no upper-middle managers for low levels of ￿￿ s). For this group, as ￿ increases, the autonomy of
workers grows, since this is the only way to raise production. Trade decreases autonomy, since these ￿rms
do not export and so the competition from foreign ￿rms reduces their quantities. As we move to ￿rms with
three layers, the autonomy of workers remains almost constant and trade has almost no e⁄ect. Eventually,
once we get to ￿rms with four layers, the autonomy of workers decreases, since the added organizational







































































































































L = 3 firms, upper-middle
managers gain autonomy
L = 1 firms, workers' gain
autonomy
L > 1 firms, workers' lose
autonomy
L = 2 firms, middle managers
gain autonomy
L > 2 firms, middle managers
lose autonomy
Firms with higher demand
become less centralized
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Figure 12: Changes in autonomy before and after a trade liberalization
Now focus on the autonomy of ￿rst-layer managers in the upper-left panel. For the ￿rms with the lowest
demand draws, these middle managers are also the entrepreneurs, since ￿rms have only two layers. As we
argued before, the autonomy of the entrepreneur decreases with ￿ and increases with a trade liberalization.
For ￿rms with three layers, the autonomy of ￿rst-layer managers increases with ￿, and with the trade
liberalization, since increasing the knowledge of middle managers is the main way in which the ￿rm expands
production and leverages the knowledge of the entrepreneur. This is also apparent in the lower-left panel
in which now the autonomy of the upper-middle managers is increasing in ￿ for ￿rms with four layers, but
not for the ones with three layers, where the upper-middle manager is the entrepreneur. Marin and Verdier
(2008) present evidence that the degree of concentration as a function of sales per employee exhibits an
inverted U-shape pattern in the data for German and Austrian ￿rms. These patterns imply that this is the
case in our theory as well.
Finally, we compute the impact of organizational changes in the gains from trade. To do so, we compare
the gains from trade in our theory to the case when we let the cost of knowledge (c=￿) converge to zero. In
that limit economy, which is isomorphic to Melitz (2003), knowledge is not a factor of production and so
trade does not trigger changes in organization. We calibrate this limit economy to the same values of the
share of expenditure on domestic goods and share of ￿rms that export. As derived in Arkolakis et al. (2011),
32the gains from trade in the limit economy are given by (Dii)
￿1=￿(￿￿1) where the parameter ￿ is calibrated
to 1:523. The gains from trade in the limit economy are 5.7%. Compared to the 8.1% welfare gains from
trade that we obtain in our model we conclude that changes in organization lead to gains from trade that
are 41% larger.
4.2. Other Measures of Productivity
We discussed above the implications of our model for the e⁄ect of bilateral trade on productivity. In
the discussion we used a measure of productivity given by q (￿)=C (q (￿);1). Even though this measure is
theoretically appealing, in many empirical studies, data on quantities and average costs at constant prices
are not readily available. Hence, we now discuss the predictions of our model for other commonly used
measures of productivity. In particular, we study how trade a⁄ects revenue productivity (measured as
r(￿)=C (q (￿);1) = p(￿)q (￿)=C (q (￿);1)), labor productivity (measured as q (￿)=n(￿) where n(￿) de-
notes the total number of employees in the ￿rm without including education workers or workers used to cover
￿xed costs), and revenue labor productivity (measured as r(￿)=n(￿)). These measures use progressively
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Figure 13: Di⁄erent measures of productivity
23 Given ￿; ￿ij; the share of ￿rms that export, Mij=Mi; and the share on domestic expenditure Dii; we calibrate ￿ to match

















33Note ￿rst a set of common characteristics of all plots in Figure 13. All measures of productivity increase
discontinuously for ￿rms that export. So the marginal exporter always gains in productivity, independently
of the measure we use. Of course, the jump in revenue productivity or revenue labor productivity for
the marginal ￿rm is larger compared to the case when we use only quantities, Since, as we have shown,
the prices of the marginal ￿rm increase discontinuously. The e⁄ect of prices also implies that using revenue
productivity leads to overall much larger changes in productivity as a result of international trade. In fact, all
￿rms, including the non-exporters, increase their revenue productivity and their revenue labor productivity.
Remember that the increase in ￿rms￿prices is the result of the increase in wages that results from the
extra varieties available to consumers in the open economy. Hence, using revenue and not quantity-based
productivity measures overestimates the gains in productivity that result from international trade. This is
consistent with the ￿ndings in De Loecker (2011).
Table 3: Productivity gains relative to autarky
Productivity Revenue productivity
Weight 1 n(￿) r(￿) q(￿) 1 n(￿) r(￿) q(￿)
All ￿rms 0.03% 0.30% 0.27% 0.22% 8.16% 8.63% 8.52% 8.47%
Exporters 0.10% 0.04% 0.05% 0.05% 8.33% 8.22% 8.21% 8.22%
Non-exporters -0.08% -0.18% -0.20% -0.21% 7.95% 7.87% 7.92% 7.89%
Marginal ￿rm 1.00% 1.82%
Labor productivity Revenue labor productivity
Weight 1 n(￿) r(￿) q(￿) 1 n(￿) r(￿) q(￿)
All ￿rms 0.08% 0.35% 0.30% 0.28% 8.21% 8.65% 8.54% 8.53%
Exporters 0.33% 0.13% 0.12% 0.13% 8.63% 8.30% 8.29% 8.29%
Non-exporters -0.03% 0.02% 0.09% 0.08% 8.00% 8.10% 8.25% 8.21%
Marginal ￿rm 2.00% 2.83%
Perhaps the more commonly used measure of productivity in the empirical literature that uses quantity-
based measures of productivity is what we call labor productivity. The reason is that it is hard to properly
adjust empirically for the knowledge of workers within the ￿rm. This measure yields a very clear empirical
implication for the changes in productivity. All non-exporters with the same number of layers should de-
crease their labor productivity and all exporters with the same number of layers should increase their labor
productivity as a result of a trade liberalization. Furthermore, ￿rms with smaller demand draws experience
larger changes (positive or negative) in labor productivity than ￿rms with high ￿￿ s. The results are reversed
for ￿rms that experience a change in layers. Non-exporters that decrease their layers gain labor productivity
34and all exporters that increase their number of layers lose productivity. Table 3 presents the average changes
in all of these measures of productivity for all ￿rms, exporters, non-exporters, and the marginal exporter
using either no weights (the column titled 1) or the number of employees, revenue, or quantities as weights
to calculate the average. All results are consistent across weights except for the change in labor productivity
for non-exporters. In this case, the unweighted average decreases while the weighted ones increase. This is
natural given that a large number of small ￿rms experience a decrease in productivity and a few larger ones
experience a substantial gain as can be seen in the lower-left panel of Figure 13. The table shows that the
increase in labor productivity for the marginal exporter is about 2%.
4.3. Trade Cost, the Costs of Knowledge, and Information Technology
We now consider alternative trade policy experiments and the e⁄ect of changes in learning costs and
information technology. The ￿rst comparative static we analyze is the case where trade costs go to zero, so
tij = 1. That is, let us consider the changes that result from moving from autarky to free trade in terms of
variable costs. We keep the ￿xed cost of exporting, since, otherwise, the internal organization of ￿rms does
not change and only wages and the number of ￿rms adjust. Figure 14 presents results that look similar to
the transition between autarky and the calibrated economy in Figure 10, but the e⁄ects are in general larger.
The average increase in productivity doubles. The size distribution has a fatter right tail, and now real
wages increase by 17.6%. The larger e⁄ects from this transition also allow us to uncover some new e⁄ects.
Namely, the average amount of knowledge decreases as we move from autarky to free trade. The reason
is that exporting ￿rms increase their number of layers and reduce the knowledge of workers in the lower
layers. Since there are more of these workers, average knowledge acquisition falls. Furthermore, income and
knowledge inequality decline as we open the economy. This was also the case when we moved from autarky
to the calibrated economy, but in this case, the e⁄ect is stronger and much more signi￿cant. The reason
is again clear: the top managers of the best and largest ￿rms learn more in autarky, since they use fewer
middle managers. Furthermore, with trade, the large spans of control that organizations with many layers
permit lead to a large concentration of workers with intermediate skills.
We can also use numerical simulations to understand the e⁄ect of changes in the ￿xed cost of exporting on
productivity and welfare. From Proposition 11 we know that if the ￿xed costs of exporting are small enough
so that all ￿rms that produce also export, in a world with two symmetric countries, ￿rms produce identical
quantities with and without trade. Thus, only the number of ￿rms and wages adjust. So for low enough
transport costs, each ￿rm has a productivity identical to its productivity in autarky. When fij = 0; it is
also the case that exporting does not increase the ￿xed cost of production, and so the production threshold
￿ ￿ does not change. Hence, when fij = 0 the productivity gain from trade liberalization is equal to zero.
Similarly, as fij ! 1, no ￿rm exports and so the economy is in autarky. Hence, productivity gains are zero
as well. For the intermediate ￿xed cost of exporting, the productivity gains are positive.























































Size distribution of firms




















































Free Trade  =  0.1849
Autarky         =  0.1839
Change        =  0.53 %
Pareto coefficient
Data             = -1.095
Free trade   = -1.01
Autarky        = -1.204
Average knowledge level
Free trade   =  0.844
Autarky        =  0.857
Change       = -1.47 % 
Coefficient of variation
Free trade  =  66.5 %
Autarky       =  71.1 %
Average income
Free trade    = 40298
Autarky         = 34156
Change        = 17.6 %
Coefficient of variation
Free trade  = 10.6 %
Autarky       = 11.5 %
Figure 14: Firm size, knowledge, income, and productivity distributions with free trade
Figure 15 presents average productivity gains and welfare gains relative to autarky for a variety of exporting
costs and for two levels of iceberg costs, ￿. As can be seen in the ￿gure, there is a range of ￿xed costs for
which all ￿rms export. Note that, in contrast to Melitz (2003) with two symmetric countries, in our theory
even if fij > fii all ￿rms in the economy might export. This is never the case in Melitz (2003), since there the
pro￿ts from foreign sales (which are always smaller than the pro￿ts from domestic sales) cannot compensate
for the ￿xed cost of the marginal producers. In our theory the pro￿ts from domestic and foreign sales are
not separable, since it is the total quantity produced that determines the organizational structure (as can
be seen in Equations (20) and (21)). So exporting increases the pro￿ts from domestic sales by changing the
organizational structure of the ￿rm. This can be appreciated in Figure 15 where for the case ￿ = 1, the
largest fij for which all ￿rms export is about 80% larger than fii: Of course, as we increase ￿, the sales in
the export market decrease and the ordering of the threshold is reversed, although this e⁄ect is still present.












































































All firms export, 
 = 1
 = 1.3
Figure 15: Welfare and productivity gains from trade as a function of fij
As we argued above, as long as all ￿rms export, ￿rms￿ quantities do not change, and therefore, the
productivity of all ￿rms remains constant. However, average productivity increases as a result of selection.
The ￿rms with the lowest demand thresholds exit, which increases average productivity. Average productivity
increases due to selection until some ￿rms decide to enter only to the domestic market. At that point further
increases in ￿xed cost decrease average productivity, since the productivity of non-exporters tends to decrease
relative to autarky. Increasing fij further leads to ￿ uctuations in average productivity as the production
threshold moves to the left and the export threshold to the right, changing their position relative to the levels
of ￿ at which ￿rms change layers. In any case, as fij increases further the productivity gains tend to zero.
In contrast to the e⁄ect on average productivity, the welfare gains from trade decrease monotonically with
fij, since the technology to export becomes progressively worse. Furthermore, a reduction in ￿ increases
welfare for any ￿nite level of ￿xed exporting costs.
We now turn to the impact of changes in the cost of knowledge, c. As we increase c leveraging knowledge
using a complex organization becomes more important. So all ￿rms tend to have taller organizations with
more layers, where decision making is more concentrated. Hence, the increase in the quantity produced
of exporters associated with international trade leads to more important changes in organization when c is
relatively large. In contrast, the organizational structure of non-exporters, which is already relatively simple,
does not change much. The result is a monotonically increasing relationship between average productivity
and c. Of course, as c increases, the technology to produce knowledge deteriorates and welfare (given by
wages since PD = 1) decreases both in autarky and the open economy. However, the decrease in welfare in
autarky dominates, leading to larger gains from trade the higher are learning costs. Organization is more
37important if c is large, since its sole purpose is to economize on knowledge acquisition. The higher c; the
more important is organization, and the increase in scale triggered by trade for exporters. The results of
this exercise are presented in Figure 16.
















































































Figure 16: Comparative statics in c



















































































Figure 17: Comparative statics in h
38We ￿nish this section with a discussion of the e⁄ect of communication technology on productivity, welfare,
and the gains from trade, presented in Figure 17. A higher parameter h decreases the span of control of
managers. Hence, creating new layers in an organization becomes less attractive. The knowledge of managers
can be leveraged less, since the spans of control are smaller given that communication costs are larger. The
economy uses less organization and the productivity gains associated with trade become less important.
The increase in the quantities produced of exporters changes the organization of exporters by less, leading
to smaller average productivity gains in the economy. Since a higher h implies a worse communication
technology, it decreases welfare both under autarky and in the open economy. However, the decline for the
open economy is larger and so the gains from trade decrease with h. An economy with worse communication
technology makes the improvements in the organization of exporters less valuable.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The goal of this paper is to understand how the ability of an economy to trade internationally impacts the
organization of production. For this purpose we propose a general equilibrium theory in which ￿rms produce
a set of di⁄erentiated products which are produced using knowledge-based hierarchies. The organization
decisions of ￿rms determine the classes of employees used in production, their knowledge, as well as the
number of each of them.
Our theory was built out of two main components. First, we have adapted the theory of organization
introduced in Garicano (2000) to derive and characterize the variable cost function for any quantity produced.
The construction and characterization of this function is one of the contributions of this paper. Its properties
are reminiscent of other costs curves proposed previously in the literature, some of them as early as Viner
(1931). However, as far as we know, this is the ￿rst paper to microfound them using a fully speci￿ed model
of organization. The bene￿ts of such a microfoundation, are twofold. First, each point in this curve can
be associated to a full description of the ￿rm and its employees. Second, we can relate the shape and
characteristics of this function to the parameters that determine the cost of acquiring and communicating
knowledge.
In order to link changes in the ability to trade with changes in within ￿rm characteristics, we need to
embed our cost function into a general equilibrium international trade model with ￿rm heterogeneity. This
can be done in multiple ways, with multiple demand systems, and using di⁄erent sources of exogenous
heterogeneity. We purposely have chosen the most standard of models to do so. Hence, we use a CES
demand system in which ￿rms produce goods that di⁄er in their level of demand. Of course, some of our
quantitative predictions are speci￿c to this particular structure. However, the main qualitative implications
of the model are robust to introducing other exogenous forms of heterogeneity (e.g. management ability)
and other demand systems. The main qualitative implication of trade for within-￿rm characteristics are the
result of movements along the cost function generated by changes in the quantities produced. So as long as
39the general equilibrium structure generates increases in the quantity produced for exporters and decreases
for non-exporters, the within-￿rm e⁄ects will be qualitatively similar.
The theory generates a variety of empirical implications. First, a trade liberalization increases the layers
of management of exporters and decreases the layers of management of non-exporters. For exporters that
increase the number of layers, we should observe decreases in the knowledge and wages of employees in
each layer but increases in the number of employees in each of them. In contrast, exporters that do not
change the number of layers should exhibit higher knowledge, wages, and numbers in each layer. The
inverse implications apply for non-exporters. The theory also has a variety of detailed implications on
prices, productivity, revenue productivity, autonomy, as well as aggregate implications on the distribution of
knowledge, income, productivity, and ￿rm sizes. Clearly, unless one restricts attention to aggregate outcomes,
information on the number of management layers used by a ￿rm is key to contrast many of these predictions
with the data. We believe this can be readily done using matched employer-employee datasets in which, in
many cases, information on the class of workers hired by a ￿rm is available.
The calibrated exercise we do in this paper is informative about the magnitude of the changes in productiv-
ity and welfare that result from changes in the organization of production as a result of a trade liberalization.
Using more detailed within-￿rm data to contrast and re￿ne the predictions of our theory is the next step in
this agenda.
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43APPENDIX
Lemma 1: Given the number of layers L, under Assumption 1, as the multiplier on the output constraint,
￿, decreases, the constraints over zl
L ￿ 0 for all l bind such that the ￿rst to hit zero is z
L￿1




L and ￿nally, zL
L.
Proof. From the ￿rst-order conditions of the cost minimization problem we obtain the following system of









































































￿￿for all 1 < l < L
Without loss of generality, consider that all knowledge in the organization is positive; therefore, ￿
l
L = 0 for





























￿ for all 1 < l < L (26)
Note that in the cost minimization problem, without restrictions on the number of inputs used, the constraint
on quantity is always binding. Therefore ￿ > 0: We will now solve sequentially, starting from the lowest layer
for the value of the Lagrange multiplier ￿ such that it makes each of the z0s zero. Let ￿ be large enough. First
note from (23) that for any value of ￿ > ￿
￿
L; zL
L > 0, where ￿
￿
L = hwc
￿A : Consider now layer zero and assume
that all other z￿ s are positive. Using condition (24) and (23) we can solve for z0





￿: This immediately implies that there exists a unique ￿













L: This implies that the zero layer constraint binds before the L layer
constraint. Now consider layer 1 and solve for ￿
￿
1 such that z1
L = 0 and all other z0s are positive. From the
￿rst-order conditions with respect to z1
L we get z1







c. It immediately follows that
there exists a unique ￿
￿
1 such that z1
L (￿
￿







￿ (1 + ln(h￿))
￿
. Note that













and ln(h￿) ￿ 0. Let￿ s consider now layer 2. We
solve for ￿
￿
2 such that z2
L = 0 and consider that all other z0s are positive, we get z2






that there exists a ￿
￿
2 such that z2
L (￿
￿







￿ ln(hln(￿) + h￿)
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as the multiplier over the output constraint, ￿, decreases, the constraints over zl
L ￿ 0 bind in a descending
order starting from z
L￿1
L up to z0
L and then zL
L.
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, for all L 6= 1 and any output level q; the knowledge of agents at all
layers is positive (zl
L ￿ 0 never binds).
Proof. Let L > 1 and consider two organizations, an unconstrained organization L with L layers, and a
constrained organization L0 with L0 layers, where L0 = L + 1 and constrained to z
L
0￿1
L0 = 0: From the cost






































































































































































L0 . Therefore, the ￿rms will choose the same z0s: However, organization
L0 will have more employees than organization L since it has one more layer. Therefore, the total cost of
organization L0 is strictly larger than organization L; by w: Note that the number of managers at layer







L0 = 1. Hence, the ￿rm will never choose to have
an organization with z
L￿1
L = 0. Lemma 1 then implies that it will never choose to have zl
L = 0 for l < L￿1.
The case for L = 0 is trivial, since z0
0 = 0 implies that the output of the ￿rm is equal to zero.
Proposition 2: Given the number of layers L, the marginal cost, MCL (q;w); and the knowledge of all
employees, zl
L for all l; increase with q: Furthermore, MCL (q;w) > 0, for all L and q, and so the cost
function C (q;w) is strictly increasing.



















































































































Note also that since MCL (q;w) = hwc
￿A e￿z
L
L > 0 for any zL
L, the cost function CL(q;w) is strictly increasing.
Since this is the case for all L, C(q;w) is strictly increasing.
Proposition 3: Suppose that the entrepreneur ￿nds it optimal to increase the number of layers at output
level q; then the marginal cost decreases discontinuously at q.
Proof. Consider an organization with L layers producing q and let ￿L be the multiplier under organization
L: Now suppose that we are at the q such that the entrepreneur ￿nds it optimal to increase the number of
layers, say, to L0 = L + 1 layers. Note that the cost minimization problem of organization L0 has an extra
￿rst-order condition compared to organization L; the ￿rst-order condition with respect to z
L
0￿1
L0 : Let the
multiplier under organization L0 be ￿L0: First note ￿L0 = ￿L is inconsistent with ￿xing q. The reason is
that if ￿L0 = ￿L then from the ￿rst-order conditions we have that zl
L0 = zl



















L0] > q. Following the same argument,
￿L0 > ￿L is inconsistent with ￿xing q; since the organization will also produce more than q given that each
z is an increasing function of ￿L0: Therefore, the only way in which L0 is optimal and it can produce q is if
￿L0 < ￿L. The marginal cost (￿) decreases as the number of layers (L) increases.
Proposition 4 Given the number of layers L; the cost function and the corresponding factor demands
have the following properties: i. The cost function is homogeneous of degree one in w. ii. Conditional factor
demands are homogeneous of degree zero in w: iii. The average cost curve is convex in q, has its minimum
where it crosses the marginal cost curve, and converges to in￿nity when q ! 0 or q ! 1.
Proof. The proof of i. is immediate from (6) and ii.
The claim in ii. follows from the ￿rst-order conditions of the cost minimization problem. Note that
equations (3) and (4), with ￿
l
L = 0 for all l and L depend on w only through the term ￿=w. Thus, if the
system of ￿rst-order conditions is satis￿ed with w, and ￿. If w0 = tw for t > 0, the system is satis￿ed with
t￿ and the rest of the allocation does not change. Hence, factor demands do not change with w.
46iii) consider ￿rst the case of a self-employed entrepreneur, L = 0. The average cost is given by

















AC0 (q;w) ￿ MC0 (q;w)
q
Note that the average cost is decreasing if AC0 (q;w) > MC0 (q;w) and increasing if AC0 (q;w) < MC0 (q;w):




















2AC0 (q;w) + c
￿A (A ￿ q)
q2
￿




AC0 (q;w) = +1; lim
q!A
AC0 (q;w) = +1;












Now consider the cost function of an organization with L layers producing q


















Recall that the marginal cost is given by MCL (q;w) = wch
￿A e￿z
L
























q = 0: (27)
Now consider the average cost of this organization,
















Some properties of this function are
lim
q!0
ACL (q;w) = +1; lim
q!+1ACL (q;w) = +1;
where we use the fact that @zL
L=@q > 0 and @z
L￿1
L =@q > 0; which follows from Proposition 2. The partial






(ACL (q;w) ￿ MCL (q;w));
where we use (27). Note that the average cost is decreasing if ACL (q;w) > MCL (q;w) and increasing if
ACL (q;w) < MCL (q;w): It has a stationary point where they are equal. In particular, there is a unique
stationary point q￿ such that
@ACL(q
￿;w)
@q = 0 and q￿ solves












































This implies that the average cost function is convex and it reaches a minimum when it intersects with the









L (q￿) + 1
￿:
Proposition 5 The minimum of the average cost for a given number of layers decreases with the number
of layers.
Proof. Consider an organization with L layers producing q￿ at the MES. From the ￿rst-order conditions
of the cost minimization problem, together with the fact that the ￿rm is producing at its MES, the L + 1






















for all 1 < l ￿ L;
where ￿ ￿ 1 + ￿
c: De￿ne the function g (x) = lnx + ￿ and abusing notation we will refer to gL (v) to the
operator applied to the function such that it evaluates the function L times over itself, namely, gL (v) =
g (g (:::::g (v))) where we are applying the g function L times.
Some properties of the function g are:
Property 1: The function gl (v) evaluated at ￿; gl (￿); is increasing in l: So
gL (￿) > gL￿1 (￿) > ln￿ + ￿ > 1 for all L:
Property 2: There exists a unique v￿; such that v￿ > ￿ and gL (v￿) = gL+1 (v￿). Note that the function
g (v) is continuously increasing. The lim
v!1
g (v) = +1; lim
v!0
g (v) = ￿1; g0 (v) = 1
v: g0 (v) ￿ 1 for all v ￿ 1
and g0 (v) ￿ 1 for all v ￿ 1 and also lim
v!1
g0 (v) = 0. Note that at v = ￿, g (￿) = ln￿ + ￿ > ￿. By the
intermediate value theorem, the function g (v) has two stationary points. In particular, there exists a unique
v￿ > ￿ such that gL (v￿) = gL+1 (v￿).
Property 3: lim
v!1
g (v) = +1 and this implies that lim
v!1
gl (v) = +1 for all l:














48Property 5: g0 (v) = 1
v => g0 (v) < 1 for all v > 1: g0 (g (v)) = 1
g(v) < 1 for all v > exp(1 ￿ ￿) since
g (v) > 1 for all v > exp(1 ￿ ￿):
These 5 properties of g are going to be used in the remaining part of the proof. We de￿ne the following
two functions
f (v) =








gL (v) + lnh
￿
:
Note that the solution for zL












We will now show that there is a unique solution to this equation and that the solution decreases with L.
Consider the following change of variables, v = ￿z + ￿: Note that when z = 0, v = ￿; and when z ! 1,
















ln(ln￿ + ￿ + lnh) by Property 1
> 0 by Assumption 1.
Note that both functions converge to in￿nity as v converges to in￿nity
lim
v!+1







gL (+1) + lnh
￿
= +1 by Property 3.

































for all z > 0 by Property 5.
We have just shown that the functions cross only once. This follows since, at z = 0; f (￿) < G(￿;L) and both
functions are continuously increasing where f increases at a higher rate than G: By the intermediate Value
theorem, this immediately implies that there exists a unique zL











49We now characterize how zL
L changes as we change L: We show that the value of zL











decreases as we increase L: In order to do so, we ￿rst show that the function G(v;L) increases
in L at z = 0 (v = ￿). Then we show that there exists a unique z￿ > 0 (v￿ > ￿) such that G(v￿;l) has the
same value for all l: Then we show that the zL










has to be larger
than z￿: Finally we show that zL
L decreases with L:













gl￿1 (￿) + lnh
￿
= G(￿;l ￿ 1) by Property 1
From property 2, there exists a unique v￿ > ￿ such that gl (v￿) = gl+1 (v￿) and this implies that G(v￿;l) =












using that v￿ = lnv￿ + ￿;
and so this implies that G(v￿;L) > f (v￿) for all 1 > h > 1=v￿: Note that h > 1=￿ > 1=v￿ by Assumption
1 and Property 2.





















G0 (v;L ￿ 1)
=
gL￿1 (v) + lnh







gL (v) + lnh
￿￿




Therefore, the knowledge of the entrepreneur, zL
L; at the MES; q￿; decreases with L. Since at the MES the
average cost is equal to the marginal cost and the marginal cost is an increasing function of zL
L; we have
shown that the minima of the average cost decrease with the number of layers, L:
Proposition 6 The level of output that achieves the MES, q￿
L, increases with the number of layers.







Proof. Consider an organization with L layers producing at the MES, q￿
L: Given q￿
L; this organization has
no incentives to modify its knowledge level at any layer. To see this, consider adding a top layer to this
organization with a span of control of one. Assigning positive knowledge to the new top layer is sub-optimal,
50since it has the same cost and bene￿t than increasing the knowledge of the manager at layer L. Given that
the knowledge of this manager was already optimal and that the cost of acquiring knowledge is linear, a new
top manager with span of control of one will increase the total cost by w but will not change production.
Now consider an organization with L+1 layers constrained to produce q￿
L where the span of control of the
manager is greater than one, as in our model. Consider the case where the knowledge of the top manager
at layer L + 1 is zero. First note that this organization, from layer L down the hierarchy, is a replica of
the organization with L layers. The di⁄erence is that there are nL
L+1 ￿ managers at the top￿replicas of these
L￿suborganizations. This immediately implies that in order to produce q￿
L each of these L￿ suborganizations
has to produce less than q￿
L: That is, the cost of the L+1 organization with zero knowledge at the top that
produces q￿










L > ACL (q￿
L;w)q￿
L;
where the inequality is the result of the convexity of AC (￿) (Proposition 4) and that q￿
L achieves the MES
with L layers. Note that if each of these L￿suborganizations produces at its MES, q￿
L, then the L + 1
organization will be producing more than q￿
L; namely nL
L+1q￿
L: Such an organization will have an average
cost of ACL (q￿
L;w) which is lower than ACL+1 (q￿
L;w) with z
L+1
L+1 = 0, but it will be producing strictly more
than q￿




L+1 > 0; since the span of control of the manager at the top is larger than one, which
results in suboptimal knowledge acquisition in the L￿suborganization. However, this adjustment is just the
result of the inability of the organization to have L￿suborganizations that produce q￿
L: Hence, the L + 1
organization necessarily incurs a higher average cost when producing q￿
L: Since by Proposition 5 we know
that organizations with higher layers have lower minimum average costs, this immediately implies that the
L + 1 organization is not at its MES at q￿
L. Moreover, we also just argued that if we relaxed the constraint
over the quantity produced, the L + 1 organization is able to produce at a lower average cost but with
a higher scale, for example, by producing nL
L+1q￿
L: Since the average cost is a convex function, and since
when producing more than q￿
L the L+1 layer organization has strictly lower average costs, this implies that
q￿
L+1 > q￿
L. Thus, the MES of the L + 1 organization has a higher scale of production than the L layer
organization.
Proposition 7 In the limit when c=￿ ! 0 and L ￿ 1, the cost function is given by



















51Proof. Consider an organization with L = 1, ￿x c and let ￿ ! 1 so that c=￿ ! 0. We guess that
lim￿!1 ￿z1































which veri￿es our guess. This also implies that lim￿!1 z1





















Then as ￿ ! 1
lim
￿!1




















AC1 (q;w) = lim
￿!1
w + A
























In the limit economy, when ￿ ! 1; the entrepreneur is able to solve all problems without any knowledge.
Therefore, the problems that the workers generate are all converted into output but z0
1 = 0. Since no
knowledge is needed for production, there are no costs incurred in acquiring knowledge. The only costs are
the wages that the manager has to pay to the workers and to himself. The number of workers in a limit
economy is given by n0
1 = q=A; therefore, the cost of production is wq=A plus w which is the wage of the
entrepreneur. The marginal cost of increasing production is the extra cost of hiring more workers, w=A:
Note that there are no gains from adding an extra layer of problem solvers. This will only increase the cost
of the organization, since it will have to pay more salaries.
Proposition 8 The quantity produced, q (￿), and revenue, r(￿), increase continuously with ￿ for a given
number of layers and increase discontinuously when the ￿rm increases the number of layers. The price,
p(￿), increases continuously with ￿ for a given number of layers and decreases discontinuously when the
￿rm increases the number of layers.
Proof. From Proposition 2 we know that the marginal cost increases with q, and at the q such that the
entrepreneur ￿nds it optimal to switch layers, the marginal cost decreases (Proposition 3), since the price set
by the entrepreneur is a constant markup over marginal cost. The properties of the marginal cost schedule
are re￿ ected in the pricing rule of the monopolist, namely, that prices increase within a number of layers


















52which follows from @MC (q (￿);w)=@q (￿) > 0: Note that when the organization increases layers, q (￿) does
not move continuously with ￿: This follows from the dependence of the production supplied on the marginal






Therefore, when the marginal cost decreases as a consequence of adding a new layer, the new quantity
supplied goes up discontinuously. The elasticity of the increase in q (￿) with respect to the marginal cost is
given by ￿.
Since r(￿) = p(￿)q (￿), the elasticity of r(￿) with respect to MC (q (￿);w) is equal to 1￿￿ < 0, and so
revenues jump up when MC (q (￿);w) jumps down as a result of an increase in the number of layers.
Proposition 9 Given L; the pro￿t function ~ ￿ (q (￿);w) is strictly concave in q. Furthermore, ￿ (￿) is
increasing and continuous in ￿.


































@q > 0 for L > 0
:
Note also that since the pro￿t function is given by






￿ C (q (￿);w) ￿ wf
and the cost and marginal cost functions are not directly a⁄ected by ￿, ￿ (￿) is increasing in ￿. Since at a
change in layers pro￿ts have to be identical, ￿ (￿) is continuous.
Proposition 10 There exists a unique stationary equilibrium.
Proof. De￿ne the following functions,




￿ (x)g (x)dx ￿ ￿wfE = 0:
An example with the properties that we prove is presented in Figure A1.
First we characterize the zero cut-o⁄ pro￿t (ZCP) schedule. Note that the schedule starts at (0;0) since
￿ZCP (0;0) = 0
















































Figure A1: Equilibrium w￿ and ￿ ￿￿
Let￿ s focus now on the ￿FE (￿;w) schedule. Note that it starts at (0; ^ w) where ^ w > 0; since ￿FE (0; ^ w) = 0,





































g (￿)d￿ are constants.
Also note that in the limit, as ￿ ! 1; w ! 0; so
￿FE (1;0) = 0:
This implies, by the intermediate value theorem, that there exists an ￿ ￿￿ and w￿ such that ￿ZCP (￿ ￿￿;w￿) = 0
and ￿FE (￿ ￿￿;w￿) = 0.
We now show that the ￿FE (￿;w) schedule increases until it reaches the ￿ZCP (￿;w) schedule and it








> 0 if ￿ < ~ ￿(w)
< 0 if ￿ > ~ ￿(w)
54which follows from
￿FE
￿ = ￿￿ (￿)g (￿)
> 0 if ￿ < ~ ￿(w)















g (x)dx < 0:
Hence, the pair (￿ ￿￿;w￿) that solves ￿ZCP (￿ ￿￿;w￿) = 0 and ￿FE (￿ ￿￿;w￿) = 0 is unique. Equations (14) and
(15) can then be directly solved to obtain M and R. This implies that an equilibrium of this economy exists
and is unique.
Proposition 11 In equilibrium a larger population size does not a⁄ect the entry threshold or the quantities
produced (and therefore the organizational structure), but increases the wages, prices, revenues and operating
pro￿ts of all active ￿rms.











is the solution under ~ N
0
;












































￿ w￿C (￿) ￿ w￿f
￿































































Note that this solution also solves the free entry condition,
1 Z
￿￿






















































We still need to show that our guess does not change q (￿). Use equation (9) to conclude that for any ￿















Hence q (￿) remains unchanged after the change in ~ N: Equation (8) implies that given q (￿), prices are
proportional to wages. Then, an increase in the price with ~ N, together with constant quantity, increases
revenues. Since revenues change proportionally to the wage, and so do costs, operating pro￿ts change
proportionally as well.
Proposition 12 In equilibrium trade liberalization increases welfare in both countries. Furthermore, the
quantity produced of all non-exporters decreases and the quantity produced of all exporters increases.
Proof. Consider ￿rst the case in which fDF = fFD = 0. Then, all ￿rms export in equilibrium. In this case
a trade liberalization is equivalent to an increase in the population size of a closed economy. Proposition
11 then implies that wages increase but the selection threshold and quantities produced remain unchanged.
Now consider an economy in which fDF = fFD > 0 and some ￿rms do not export. Since not all ￿rms expand
their market, wD then increases by less than
￿￿





(the increase that would result if all
￿rms were to export), since non-exporters are not selling to foreign ￿rms and they are not demanding labor
accordingly. As a result the e⁄ect of wages and population sizes that a⁄ect production according to equations
(19), (20), and (21) goes from ￿ w
1￿￿




￿ij ~ Nj + ~ Ni
￿
(where ￿ wD denotes the
wage in the closed economy). The new term is larger in the open economy, since wages adjust less than
what Proposition 11 predicts. This implies that the total production of exporters has to necessarily increase.
Non-exporters do not get access to the foreign market so the relevant e⁄ect on sales is necessarily decreasing
in wD by equation (18). Toward a contradiction, suppose that opening to trade leads to a decline in wD.
Then, by the reasoning above, production of non-exporters and exporters increases, which by Proposition 2
increases their labor demands since by Proposition 4 the cost function is homogeneous of degree one. This
contradicts the labor market clearing condition in (22). Hence, wD strictly increases, and the production of
non-exporters decreases and that of exporters increases with trade liberalization. Of course, since our choice
of a domestic country is arbitrary, this applies to the other country as well.
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